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Foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to be made into Africa, as an 
important means of strengthening the national economies of the various 
countries in which it is undertaken. However, while FDI inflows continue into 
these economies, there has been a relative decline in FDI attractiveness into 
Africa as shown by Africa’s share of global FDI inflows which stood at only 
4.4 per cent in 2010.1 One of the factors that deter FDI is political instability 
caused by government actions. It is noted2 that in some instances following a 
regime change, there is a repudiation of former contracts with foreign firms, 
increasing the risk of expropriation and thereby reducing the volume of FDI3.  
 
An example of a regime change that resulted in the cancellation of contracts 
with foreign firms and the expropriation of property rights that had been 
acquired as a result of those contracts, is that which occurred in Zambia in 
2012 with the [repossession] by the government of Zamtel Limited, a 
telecommunications company, and the termination of a concession agreement 
entered into by the government with Zambia Railways Limited. While the 
right to expropriate property of citizens is the sovereign preserve of every 
state (provided that such expropriation is in the public interest and is 
accompanied by adequate compensation for the person from whom the 
property is expropriated) there remain instances where states abuse this 
sovereign right and carry out unlawful expropriations.  
 
Although most states have legislation which regulates expropriations, there 
remain some gaps in domestic legislation that do not adequately safeguard 
the rights of persons whose property is expropriated. Unlawful and arbitrary 
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expropriations carried out by states without impunity, are a major deterrent 
to FDI.   
 
It is therefore necessary to consider whether the current international law 
framework relating to expropriations, provides an effective means for 
safeguarding the interests of property owners whose property is 
expropriated, where domestic legislation falls short of the required standard. 
These considerations will in this paper be examined in the context of 
international commercial contracts entered into by foreign entities with 
governments. These considerations are further necessary in order to offer 
solutions to foreign investors who may find their property unlawfully 
expropriated as a result of political action, and who may be unable to seek 
proper or meaningful redress under the domestic laws of the expropriating 
states. Establishing the extent of the remedies that are provided by 
international law may seek to encourage FDI inflows into developing 
economies, even in the face of the real risk of political instability resulting in 







The policy of privatisation of state controlled enterprises in developing 
countries has largely resulted in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows being 
made into these countries and consequently, foreign firm participation in 
privatisation transactions. In Zambia, a policy of partial and full privatisation 
of state owned entities was embarked upon in 1992 with the creation of the 
Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA)4 which was tasked with overseeing the 
privatisation and commercialisation of these enterprises5. This 
commercialisation and privatisation has continued to be undertaken and is 
primarily regulated by the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA)6 which 
replaced the ZPA. The general mandate of the ZDA is to facilitate both local 
and foreign investments that are made into the Zambian economy and to this 
end, it has been at the centre of negotiations whenever any state owned entity 
is sought to be privatised either fully or partially. 
 
It is against this background that the ZPA and then later the ZDA, has 
overseen several privatisations which have included the partial privatisation 
of the largest stated owned entities such as the Zambia National Commercial 
Bank7, the privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM)8, 
the privatisation of Zambia Railways through the signing of a concession 
agreement between the Government of Zambia (hereinafter the 
                                                            
4 Established by the Privatisation Act, Chapter 386 of the Laws of Zambia.  
5 Preamble to the Act 
6 Established by the Zambia Development Agency Act No. 11 of 2006 
7 This involved the acquisition of a 49 per cent stake in the Bank  together with management control, by Rabo 
Bank of the Netherlands, while 0.2 per cent of the shareholding  was transferred to minority shareholders and 
the Government of Zambia retained the remainder of the shareholding. ‘Zanaco: A successful privatisation 
story’ The Zambian Economist, 4 October 2008, available at http://www.zambian-
economist.com/2008/10/zanaco-successful-privatisation-story.html, accessed on 27 March, 2013. 
8 The privatisation of ZCCM was achieved through a series of sale agreements with respect to the various mines 
that comprised the consortium, which began in about March of 1997 through to the end of 2000 between the 
Government of Zambia and several local and foreign entities. S Kangwa ‘Report on the Privatisation of Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines’ The Copperbelt University School of Technology and Mining Department, July 
2001, available at http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G02454.pdf, accessed on 27 March, 2013. 
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“government”) and Railway Systems of Zambia Limited9, which is a 
subsidiary of NLPI Limited, a Mauritian registered company and more 
recently, the privatisation of the national telecommunications provider, 
Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (Zamtel). 
 
 A common factor in each of these privatisations is that they were achieved by 
means of valid legal share and or asset sale agreements entered into with the 
government, irrespective of the motive or purpose (political or otherwise) for 
which they were concluded. In the majority of these transactions, the 
government would retain minority shareholding in the former state entities 
and the other party to the transaction would assume majority shareholding 
and possibly, management control of the particular entity. Another common 
factor in each of these privatisations has been that the counterparties have 
been foreign incorporated or registered entities. Also important to note, is that 
all these privatisations were concluded during the 20 year political rule of the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), whose tenure unexpectedly 
came to an end in September of 2011.  
 
It is true therefore that a lot of these privatisations were initiated and perhaps 
even driven by several political factors and interests of the ruling 
government. However, what is also significant, and of relevance to this paper, 
is that these privatisations, which were overseen by legitimately established 
statutory bodies10, and which often involved government calls for bidders to 
participate in buy-ins into the various enterprises that were sought to be 
privatised, (following which there would be a selection of a successful 
bidder), were concluded as legally binding contracts which could only be set 
aside in accordance with their respective terms.  
 
                                                            
9 J Batwell ‘Zambia to review RSZ Concession’ RailAdvisor.com; Global Railway Information, 7 September 
2012, available at http://www.railjournal.com/index.php/africa/zambia-to-review-rsz-concession.html, accessed 
on 27 March, 2013. 
10 Such as the ZPA, the ZDA and the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (established by the Public 
Procurement Act No. 12 of 2008). 
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The ushering in of the new Patriotic Front (PF) government in Zambia in 
September 2011, saw with it shifts in policy issues such as privatisation. The 
new government had prior to elections, intimated that it would ‘reverse’ 
several of the privatisation transactions concluded by the then ruling MMD 
government, as these transactions were allegedly marred with corruption. In 
particular, the then opposition PF had singled out the privatisations of the 
Zambia National Commercial Bank, Zambia Railways and more prominently, 
that of Zamtel.  It was no surprise therefore, that almost immediately after the 
new Government assumed office, the wheels were set in motion11 for these 
‘reversals’ to begin to occur, with the reversal of the Zamtel privatisation and 
later the termination of the Zambia Railways Concession Agreement being 
the first two major reversals that have occurred. What is interesting however, 
is that rather than arbitrarily and without any legal basis, reversing these 
privatisations, the Government sought to exercise its sovereign right of 
expropriation and used this as the basis for cancelling the above two 
agreements. 
 
1.2 Case Study: Government of the Republic of Zambia v LAP Green Networks 
of Libya 
In June 2010, following a series of negotiations between the government of 
Zambia and LAP Green Networks of Libya (LAP)12, a Share Sale and 
Purchase Agreement, for the purchase by LAP of 75 per cent shareholding in 
Zamtel (represented by 250,000,000 shares in Zamtel) was concluded between 
the two parties13. As stated earlier, in terms of the agreement, the government 
was to retain 25 per cent shareholding in the company. The decision to 
                                                            
11In October 2011, pursuant to a presidential directive, a public inquiry into the sale of Zamtel was 
commissioned. “Potential Effects of the Reversal of the Sale of Zamtel on Foreign Direct Investment in 
Zambia” Augustine Clement Solicitors, 2 February, 2012 available at 
http://www.augustineclement.com/potential-effects-of-the-reversal-of-the-sale-of-zamtel-on-foreign-direct-
investment-in-zambia/ accessed on 27 March, 2013 
12 Lap GreenN is a Mauritian Company, which has its headquarters in Uganda, and is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Libya Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP). LAP is in turn wholly owned by the Libya Investment 
Authority which is Libya’s sovereign wealth fund, available at http://www.lap-greenn.com/our-history.php, 
accessed on 17 July, 2013. 
13 N, Mwape “Zamtel biggest investment abroad- Lap GreenN” Zambia Daily Mail 8 June 2010, 3. LAP 
GreenN paid a purchase price of USD 257,000,000 for the 75 per cent shares in Zamtel. 
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privatise Zamtel was taken by the government following the poor 
performance of the company for several years prior to its privatisation14. 
 
As stated earlier, almost immediately after assuming office, the new 
government set about ‘reversing’ the Zamtel sale. In October of 2011, the 
President announced that a commission of inquiry was to be set up to look 
into the sale of Zamtel. The commission of inquiry, which was chaired by the 
Minister of Justice concluded its work in October 2011 and among its key 
recommendations15 were the “immediate termination of all Agreements relating to 
the sale of Zamtel to LAP” and the “immediate return of 100 per cent of Zamtel to 
the people of Zambia”16.  
 
The President agreed with the recommendations of the commission of inquiry 
and on 23 January 2012, the government of Zambia, through the office of the 
Attorney General, served on Zamtel, a “Notice of intention to acquire 
property and a Notice to yield possession” (the Notice)17. The Notice, which 
was issued in the name of the President, and which resolved that “…it was 
desirable and expedient and in the interest of the Republic…” that the ‘property’ 
(which was in this case the 250,000,000 million shares in Zamtel that had been 
purchased by LAP) be compulsorily acquired and that in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act, notice be given to the company (LAP), to such effect.18  
The notice stated further that the President had “certified that the property was 
urgently required” and called upon LAP to yield possession19 of the property 
on or before 24 January 2012. 
 
                                                            
14 Ministerial statement given by the Honourable Minister of Transport and Communications Professor Geoffrey 
Lungwangwa MP to the National Assembly of Zambia on 7 August, 2009 available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=976&Itemid=86, accessed on 
17 July, 2013. 
15 “Report to H.E The President of the Republic of Zambia Mr Michael Chilufya Sata of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Sale of Zamtel Chaired by Hon. Sebastian Zulu S.C. Minister of Justice” p 3, available at 
http://www.lusakatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/zamtelfinalreport.pdf , accessed on 23 July, 2013. 
16 Ibid 
17 Government gazette citation 
18 Sections 5 of the Lands Acquisition Act. 
19 In accordance with section 6 of the Lands Acquisition Act 
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Following the issue of the Notice, and without further announcement made 
by the government on the issue of compensation to LAP  for the compulsorily 
acquired shares in Zamtel, LAP  filed a constitutional petition into the Lusaka 
High Court on 19 March 201220, seeking several orders relating to the 
protection of LAP  compulsorily acquired shares in Zamtel. The particular 
relief sought in the Petition will be set out later on in the paper. At present, 
there has been no agreement reached between LAP and the government and 
the two parties continue to be embroiled in litigation over inter alia, the 
legality of the expropriation and the applicable compensation.21   
 
1.3 Aims and significance of the study 
1.3.1 Aim of study 
The main aim of this study in this paper is to analyse the nature and extent of 
the relief22  that is available under regional and international law to an 
investor whose property is unlawfully expropriated by a state, and to 
highlight the inadequacies thereof. Unlawful expropriations are those which 
in terms of international customary law, cannot, objectively viewed, be said to 
be for public purpose, non-discriminatory and accompanied by adequate 
compensation23. In this regard, a discussion will be made of the major 
international law tribunals or bodies (and the relevant principles or treaties 
which may be relied upon), both regionally and in the wider international 
community, to which disputes relating to unlawful expropriations may be 
brought by an affected investor. The jurisdiction of such tribunals and the 
nature of reliefs that they may provide, based on applicable international law 
principles or treaties, will also be examined. 
 
                                                            
20 Constitutional Petition filed into the Principal Registry of the Lusaka High Court on 19 March 2012. 
Accessed on 15 June 2013. 
21 Ibid 
22 An important objective of the paper is to set out the practical reliefs that would be available to investors, 
against the background that there may be many possible theoretical reliefs, but few practical ones which may 
actually allow the investors to recover their investments, or at least mitigate the commercial losses that they may 
have incurred as a result of the expropriation.   
23 Y Xiaodong State Immunity in International Law (2012) 307.  
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Another aim of the study is to consider the effectiveness of orders that may be 
made by regional or international tribunals in light of the fact that such orders 
may be unenforceable within the domestic laws of the states against which 
they are sought to be enforced. Further, it will be shown with the illustration 
of case law that even in the event that such an order made by a regional or 
international tribunal can be registered within a state’s domestic laws, there 
still remains the real challenge of enforcing the order against the state. In this 
regard, it is important to consider whether  the refusal of a state to comply 
with an order of an international tribunal, the jurisdiction of which it validly 
submits to, can be said to be a breach of its international law obligations, for 
which it can be held accountable. In other words, it will be considered 
whether there are any sanctions, administrative or otherwise that may be 
imposed on a recalcitrant state to serve as a future deterrent to such a state or 
any other state against carrying out unlawful expropriations. 
 
The study ultimately aims to show that despite the existence of regional and 
international tribunals that may have jurisdiction to hear investment disputes 
(such as the Zamtel dispute), the remedies that are available to investors 
remain largely inadequate for the various reasons that will be pointed out.  
An attempt will be made at proposing solutions that would effectively 
address the inadequacies highlighted, in order to ensure that more effective 
remedies are available to investors who find themselves in the unfavourable 
position that LAP finds itself in. 
 
1.3.2 Significance of study 
As stated earlier, expropriations, motivated largely by political considerations 
and not made for public purpose, will continue to be carried out, particularly 
following a regime change. This is true more so in developing countries. In 
the era of FDI, it is necessary to set out the remedies that are available to 
investors who find themselves in the unfortunate situation of having their 
investments unlawfully expropriated. It is particularly important to set out 
the remedies that are available under international law because in most cases, 
13 
 
any actions that may be commenced against a state in the context of domestic 
law may be frustrated by the state, particularly in those states where there is 
no real separation of power between the executive functions and those of the 
judiciary.  
 
Establishing whether there are any remedies available under international 
law, and the mechanisms by which a dispute for an unlawful expropriation 
may be brought before an international tribunal, is important for investors 
engaging in FDI as it provides them with options that may allow them to 
protect their investments or at least mitigate the losses that they would suffer 
as a result of unlawful takings by states. This is crucial for investors who very 
often have invested substantial amounts of money or infrastructure into the 
respective foreign state economies and stand to suffer significant losses to 
their business ventures as a result of unlawful expropriations. Corollary, 
establishing the remedies that may be available under international law 
where a state unlawfully expropriates property, may serve to encourage 
foreign investors to invest into state economies24, even against the real risk of 
arbitrary expropriations which may not be accompanied by adequate or 
effective compensation. 
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
In the second chapter, a brief review of the law relating to property 
expropriation will be provided. The review will also consider the procedure 
that follows an expropriation and the recourse that is available to an affected 
property owner.   Case law will be used to illustrate how the Zambian courts 
have dealt with disputes over state expropriation and the decisions reached in 
this regard. 
 
The focus of the discussion in this chapter will be on whether the Zambian 
Constitution which recognises property ownership as a fundamental right 
                                                            
24 Particularly into developing economies which are prone to political instability or arbitrary state action driven 
by political motives.  
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seeks to adequately protect against unlawful expropriations. This is in light of 
the fact that the constitutional provision that contemplates property 
expropriation by the state does not mandate it to carry out an expropriation 
only where this is done for a public purpose or in the public interest, in line 
with most modern Constitutions of democratic states.   
 
The discussion will further involve an examination into whether the 
Constitution grants other fundamental rights, and in particular the right to 
just administrative action, which serve to further strengthen the protection of 
property rights. In both cases, reference will be made to the South African 
constitutional provisions which offer seemingly stronger protections for the 
right to property ownership and from which the Zambian constitutional 
provisions can be adapted. 
 
The third chapter will consider in a little more detail, the current dispute 
between the government of Zambia and LAP over the expropriation of the 
250,000,000 shares that had been acquired by LAP in Zamtel. The provisions 
of the Lands Acquisition Act that were relied on as the legal means by which 
the expropriation was carried out as well as the reasons advanced by the 
Government for its action, will be analysed in brief detail. Thereafter, the 
discussion will move to consider the actions that followed the expropriation, 
with particular reference to the pending court litigation between LAP and the 
Government and the efficacy of the remedies sought by LAP in the various 
court applications, within the existing legal framework in Zambia vis-ã-vis 
property expropriation.  
 
The fourth chapter will be the focus of the discussion and will consider the 
recourse that is available to an investor in the position of LAP under 
international law. This will be achieved by analysing the jurisdiction of the 
judicial wing of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) at 
the [African] regional level and that of the International Centre for the 
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Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the ICSID Convention, and 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules at the international level.   
 
The discussion will be centred on considering the limited orders that may be 
made against states by the adjudicating bodies, often resulting in the 
inadequate protection of investors’ interests following the unlawful 
expropriation of their property. It will be argued in this chapter that although 
there are some limitations inherent in the jurisdiction of the regional and 
international adjudicating fora which may therefore restrict the orders that 
they can make against erring states, there are other means by which effective 
remedies can be provided for investors, particularly where the orders serve as 
deterrents against future unlawful expropriations.  Reference will be made to 
case law, to illustrate how the relevant adjudicating bodies have dealt with 
investment disputes relating to unlawful expropriations and the orders that 
have been made against states in those disputes.  
 
An attempt will also be made at considering the possible options, if any, that 
may be available to LAP under the international law framework in the event 
that it is unsuccessful in obtaining the orders that it seeks against in the 
Government, in the applications that are before the Zambian courts. 
 
Chapter five will be a summary and conclusion of the above four chapters. It 
will further provide recommendations for additional safeguards such as the 
insistence by investors engaging in FDI activities such as privatisation, of the 
conclusion of bilateral investment agreements and other international 
investment agreements. The chapter will also recommend the imposition of 
some measure of sanctions, administrative or otherwise, for states that refuse 
to comply with the orders made by international tribunals, as this may serve 
the double purpose of forcing the erring states to comply with such orders 




2. EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY IN ZAMBIA 
2.1 Legal basis for the expropriation of property in Zambia 
2.1.1 Property ownership as a right under the Zambian Constitution 
Under the Zambian legal system, ownership is the most complete right in a 
thing. Generally speaking, it entitles the owner to use his property in the way 
he wishes.25 However, there are instances in which the right to ownership 
may be limited and one of these ways is through state takings or 
expropriation. It is accepted that although the protection of a citizen’s rights 
in property is an important principle in a civilised society, the state has 
always been able to acquire rights in citizen’s property, when doing so is 
considered to be in the public interest.26  
 
In Zambia, the general law relating to property ownership and the 
expropriation27 thereof is contained in the Constitution of Zambia.28 The 
Constitution is the supreme law of Zambia and any law that is inconsistent 
with it is void to the extent of the inconsistency.29 The Constitution30 provides 
for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of persons in Zambia, 
which includes the protection from the deprivation of property without 
compensation.31 It is thus accepted under the Zambian legal order that the 
right to property ownership is a fundamental right, ensured and protected by 
the Constitution.32 
 In articulating the right to property ownership, the Constitution provides 
firstly that “no property of any description (including any interest or right in 
                                                            
25 F Mudenda Land Law in Zambia: Cases and Materials (2007) 63. 
26 Gildenhuys 1-2 in M Southwood The Compulsory Acquisition of Rights (2000) 2. 
27 In Zambia, the term “compulsory acquisition” is used in both the Constitution and legislation to refer to 
expropriation. The term ‘expropriation’ will be used in this discussion to refer to compulsory acquisition in 
Zambia. 
28 Chapter 1 of the Laws of Zambia. 
29 Article 1 (3). 
30 In Article 11. 
31 Article 11(d). 
32 Mudenda op cit 1 at 64. 
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property) is to be expropriated except by an Act of Parliament which provides for 
payment of adequate compensation for the property”33. The Constitution further 
directs in this regard that the Act of Parliament so enacted to provide for 
compensation, should make provision for the determination of the amount 
thereof by a court, in instances where there is no agreement on the amount of 
compensation payable.34 
 
It is clear from the above that the Zambian Constitution contemplates the 
expropriation of property by the state. Such expropriation will only be 
constitutionally valid however, if it is carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of relevant legislation which provides for the payment of 
compensation. There is no further guidance given on the purpose for which 
property expropriation is to be undertaken and the factors that must be had 
regard to, in the determination of what would amount to adequate 
compensation.  
 
A bare reading of the constitutional provision would suggest that, provided 
that an expropriation is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 
relevant Act of Parliament that regulates the expropriation and determines 
the compensation payable, it can be carried out for any reason, even if that 
reason is arbitrary or illegal. So for example, legislation that has the effect of 
permitting the arbitrary expropriation of property by the state would not be 
unconstitutional. It is obviously incomprehensible that the Constitution 
would sanction an arbitrary expropriation, or even one that is carried out in 
bad faith by the state, provided that this is done in accordance with the 
relevant legislation. However, the provision as it is drafted, leaves room for 
expropriations to be carried out for no proper or justifiable reason, where 
there is no legal or, more importantly, constitutional basis to challenge such 
expropriations.  
 
                                                            
33 Article 16 (1). 
34 Article 16 (3). 
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In contrast, the South African Constitution35 provides with respect to property 
expropriation that property may only be expropriated in terms of a law of 
general application, in the public interest36; or for a public purpose subject to 
compensation which should have been agreed by those affected or which is 
set by the court.37  In setting out additional basic requirements that 
expropriations must comply with, particularly that expropriations must be  
undertaken for a public purpose, or in the public interest, the Constitution 
provides stronger safeguards (than those provided under the Zambian 
Constitution) for property owners against illegal or arbitrary state takings 
because the latter will be required to show that it has complied with all the 
requirements set by the Constitution, if the expropriation is to be 
constitutionally valid and therefore legal. 
 
It is submitted that in the constitutional and democratic state that Zambia 
professes to be, the Constitution should expressly provide that property 
expropriation is only to be undertaken, where there is a public purpose or 
public interest that plainly demands such expropriation. It is accepted that 
constitutional provisions are to be given a purposive interpretation to avoid 
the absurd consequence of their literal interpretation resulting in illegal or 
unconstitutional outcomes. However, interpretation is a preserve of the courts 
with the consequence that different results may be reached, even on a 
purported purposive interpretation. This is particularly problematic in 
jurisdictions where, like in Zambia, there is no specialised constitutional court 
that is specifically established to interpret the various constitutional 
provisions and the rights afforded thereby. As the position is in Zambia, too 
much leeway is given to an Act of Parliament to determine, to a large extent, 
the protection that will be given to property rights against state takings, 
which is a matter that should mainly be a preserve of the Constitution. 
 
                                                            
35 Constitution of South Africa, 1996 
36 The public purpose for which property may be expropriated is explained in section 25 (4) as including the 
nation’s commitment t land reform, and reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural 
resources. 
37Section 25 (2) (a) and (b).  
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Another issue of concern relating to the inadequacy in the protection of 
property rights against ‘unlawful’ expropriations in the Zambian 
constitutional order relates to the fact that there is no constitutional provision 
giving an affected property owner the right to challenge an expropriation by 
the state, even one that is not accompanied by adequate compensation.  
Expropriation of property which is invariably an administrative act must be 
subject to review if it is carried out in an unjust manner against an affected 
property owner. In the event that the Act of Parliament enacted to regulate 
property expropriation does not give the affected property owner the right to 
exercise their right to just administrative action, they are left with no recourse 
to challenge the state’s action and are therefore further deprived of their 
constitutional right to property ownership. 
 
There is a right to judicial review of an administrative act that is 
unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal under the Zambia legal system, based on the 
common law audi alteram partem rule. However, in terms of the Zambian High 
Court civil procedure relating to judicial review38, an aggrieved person must 
first seek leave of the court before they can file their application and the court 
may refuse to grant such leave, in its discretion.39 There is no legislative 
obligation on the state to provide written reasons for its decisions or for the 
affected person to be given a fair hearing.   
 
An aggrieved person can therefore only rely on the judicial review of the 
administrative act, and that if a court finds that the state did not follow the 
proper procedure in taking the administrative decision that it did, only then 
will the person have an opportunity to be given a hearing or to request for 
written reasons of the decision made against him. However, if this leave to 
file an application for judicial review is refused, this is the end of the matter 
act that adversely affects his rights. 
 
                                                            
38 Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England, 1999.   
39 Order 53,rule 3. 
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By way of comparison, in the South African context, the protection against 
arbitrary or unlawful expropriation is further strengthened by the right to just 
administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair40 as 
guaranteed by Constitution.41  The right to just administrative action is given 
further effect to, in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)42. The 
right to just administrative action guaranteed by the Constitution enables 
persons affected or aggrieved by decisions of the state relating to the 
expropriation of property, to be given written reasons for the decision taken 
by the state43 or to bring an application for judicial review before the courts44 , 
for the purpose of requiring the latter to review the decision of the former. In 
this way, the state is ‘precluded’ from carrying out an expropriation if there is 
no justifiable reason (being public purpose or public interest) for doing so.  
  
The right of an aggrieved person to directly challenge before the courts, a 
potentially unjust administrative decision to expropriate his property, as is 
the case in the South African system (through the constitutionally mandated 
PAJA), is of utmost importance in the safeguarding against arbitrary or 
unreasonable expropriations. 
 
2.1.2 Procedure relating to property expropriation in Zambia 
The primary piece of legislation that regulates the expropriation of property 
in Zambia is the Lands Acquisition Act (the “LAA”).45 The purpose of the 
LAA is primarily to make provision for the “compulsory acquisition” of land 
and other property and to provide for matters incidental to or connected to 
the purpose of such acquisition.46   
 
                                                            
40 Section 33(1). 
41 In section 33. 
42 Act 3 of 2000. 
43 Section 33 (2). 
44 In accordance with the provisions of the PAJA which was enacted in pursuance of the directive given by s 
33(3) of the Constitution for the enactment of national legislation which would give effect to the rights in 
subsections (1) and (2). 
45 Chapter 189 of the Laws of Zambia. 
46 Preamble to the Act. 
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In terms of the LAA, property is defined as “…including land and any interest 
or right over property…”47  The above definition is however not 
comprehensive48 in setting out the kind of property that is encompassed 
thereunder. However, it is submitted that the drafters of the LAA must have 
intended for the term ‘property’ to be given its literal meaning as including 
property of any kind49 that is capable of being expropriated. Further the fact 
that there is currently no other Act that regulates the expropriation of 
property in Zambia, lends legitimacy to the assumption that the LAA 
contemplates the expropriation of all kinds of property.   
 
The LLA empowers the President to expropriate property of any description 
whenever he is of the opinion that “it is desirable or expedient, in the interests of 
the republic to do so”50. The relevant section does not set out the instances in 
which the President may decide that it is ‘desirable’ or ‘expedient’ to 
expropriate property and thus this remains largely within his subjective 
determination.  
 
In attempting to provide guidance on when the President may form the 
requisite opinion for the purposes of expropriating property, it has been held 
by the High Court of Zambia51, that the fact that the Act is silent on the 
question of the purpose for which the President may expropriate property 
upon payment of compensation, does not per se give the state a blanket right 
to expropriate property without any [public] cause or purpose.52  
 
Following the President’s decision to expropriate property, the relevant 
Minister is required to serve a notice of the intention to expropriate property 
on the persons interested in the property.53 The notice is also required to 
                                                            
47 Section 2. 
48 The Act does however set out a comprehensive definition of “land” that may be expropriated. This definition 
will however not be set out as it does not directly relate to the discussion in the paper.  
49 This would conceivably include both tangible and intangible property. 
50 Section 3 of the Act. 
51 Wise v The Attorney  General (1990/92) ZR 124.   
52 Ibid, 129. 
53 Section 5. 
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invite any person claiming to be interested in such property to submit such 
claim to the Minister within four weeks of the publication of the notice.54  
 
In addition to the notice to persons affected as described above, the Minister 
is also required to serve a further notice on them, to the effect that they are 
required to yield possession of the property to be expropriated, upon the  
expiration of the period stated therein. This may be included in the original 
notice of expropriation55 or in any subsequent notice.56 The period stated in 
the notice should not be less than two months from the date of service of the 
notice57 and upon expiration of the stated period, the President or any person 
authorised by him may take possession of the property. 58 
 
The LLA further provides that where the President certifies that the property 
in question is urgently required, the persons to whom any notices of the 
expropriation would have been served, may be required to yield possession 
of the property to the government on the expiration of such lesser period as 
the President may direct.59   
 
The LAA then sets outs the procedure that is followed with regard to 
compensation for the expropriated property. It provides that Minister is 
required to pay, on behalf of the government, the amount of compensation as 
agreed between the affected property owner and the latter, or in default of 
agreement, in accordance with the principles of the LAA, to the person whose 
property is expropriated.60  
 
                                                            
54 Section 5(2). 
55 Contemplated in section 5. 
56 Section 6(1).  
57 Ibid. 
58 Section 6(2). 
59 Ibid. 
60 As provided for by section 10. 
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In setting out the relevant principles to be taken account in assessing the 
amount of compensation payable61, the LAA provides firstly that a court, 
determining the issue of compensation, will take into account the value of 
property.62 The determination of the value of the property is however subject 
to several qualifications. For example that any money granted by the 
Government for the development of the property or any other investment or 
donations made by the Government will be taken into account and deducted 
from any amount of compensation payable.63 
 
Where a dispute arises over the amount of compensation payable, and if such 
dispute is not settled within six weeks of publication of the notice to yield 
possession, either the Minister or the person affected by the compensation is 
permitted to refer the dispute to the High Court. The court is then to 
determine the compensation payable.64  
 
Where there is a dispute regarding the amount of compensation payable, the 
LAA provides that the government may only take possession of the 
expropriated property after payment of the amount regarded by the Minister 
as “just compensation” to the affected property owner65, presumably leaving 
the final determination and the possibility that the government will be 
ordered to pay additional compensation for a later date.   
 
It is logical to conclude in this regard that since there will almost always be 
disagreement relating to the amount of compensation that should be paid to 
an affected owner, the effect of the provision, at least in theory, is that prior to 
                                                            
61 Section 12 generally provides the various guidelines on the payment of compensation following the 
expropriation of property. 
62 Section 12(b) contemplates that the relevant value will be arrived at by having regard to the amount which the 
property might be expected to realise if sold in the open market by a willing seller at the time of publication of 
the notice to yield up possession.  
63 Section 12 (b) (i). 
64 Section 11 (2). 
65 Section 11 (4).  
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the government tendering effective compensation for the expropriation66, it 
cannot remove the property from the possession of the property owner. 
 
However, the default position under the LAA is that the government may 
take possession of the property prior to offering compensation to the property 
owner, unless there is a dispute as described above. 
 
2.1.3 Investment laws and the expropriation of property 
The principle investment code for Zambia is the Zambia Development 
Agency (ZDA) Act. The purpose of the Act is primarily to attract and facilitate 
trade and investment in Zambia.67 In doing so, the Act provides for certain 
investment guarantees for investors.68  
 
One of the guarantees provided for investors, is the protection from 
expropriation of property.69 The protection from expropriation is worded in 
much the same way as under the Constitution and provides that property will 
only be expropriated for a public purpose and in accordance with relevant 
legislation which provides for the payment of compensation.70  
 
 The ZDA Act goes on further to provide that the amount of compensation 
payable in the event of an expropriation, should be made promptly at the 
market value and “will be fully transferable at the applicable exchange rate in the 
currency in which the investment was originally made, without deductions for taxes, 
levies and other duties, except where those are due”. 71 
 
The protection of investors from unlawful expropriation as stated under the 
ZDA Act points to the fact that in the case of an expropriation against an 
investor, the latter is, in addition to the Constitution and the Lands 
                                                            
66 After it has served the requisite notice of the expropriation on the property owner. 
67 Preamble to the Act. 
68 Part IV: Investment Promotion and Guarantees. 
69 Section 19. 
70 Section 19(1). 
71 Section 19(2). 
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Acquisition Act, also guided by the ZDA Act on the legal position relating to 
property expropriation in Zambia. 
 
Two issues arise with respect to the ‘expropriation section’ under the ZDA 
Act. Firstly, in stating that property will only be expropriated “for public 
purposes in accordance with an Act of Parliament that provides for compensation”, it 
is merely restating the constitutional position and to this end, it adds nothing 
to the substantive rights that investors have against arbitrary deprivation or 
expropriation of their property by the state.72  
 
Secondly, although the provision under the ZDA Act simply restates the 
constitutional position regarding property expropriation and acknowledges 
that expropriations will be carried out in accordance with an Act of 
Parliament enacted for this purpose, a further provision purports to set out 
how the compensation payable for the expropriation is to be calculated, and 
the manner in which payment is to be made to the affected investor73.  
 
It is submitted that this additional ‘regulation’ regarding the determination of 
the compensation payable is potentially problematic. The main issue that 
arises in this regard is that the LAA, which is the legislation enacted to “make 
provision for the compulsory acquisition of land and other property, and to provide 
for matters incidental to or connected to the foregoing”74, does not contemplate the 
regulation of compensation for state expropriations by any other Act and 
therefore, does not qualify the relevant provisions thereunder, on the manner 
in which the compensation to be paid should be calculated. The obvious 
result of the above is that there is some conflict between the position 
                                                            
72 It is further submitted that the ZDA Act which was drafted and came into force many years after the Lands 
Acquisition Act, could have expressly stated that expropriations are to take place in terms of the latter Act (and 
not simply state that this will be done ‘‘in accordance with an Act of Parliament which provides for 
expropriation ……’’, as the latter is invariably the Act that is being referred to in this regard. As the primary 
investment code for Zambia, the ZDA Act should be express in referring investors (particularly foreign 
investors who are not familiar with Zambian laws), to specific other Acts which will regulate the different 
aspects of their activities (and those not regulated by the former), so as to ensure certainty. 
73 For example the section (section 19 (2)) refers to the payment of compensation at the prevailing exchange rate 
and that the compensation will be made in the currency in which the investment was originally made. 
74 Preamble to the LAA 
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regarding the determination of the amount of compensation and whether 
such compensation is payable under either the LAA or the ZDA Act, at the 
election of the affected investor.  
 
Where an investor has their property expropriated, it would be preferable to 
have the amount of compensation payable determined under the more 
favourable provisions of the ZDA Act. However, if the state purports to base 
their expropriation on the authority of the LAA which regulates all issues 
relating to property expropriation, including those relating to compensation, 
it is not clear whether an investor can insist on having the compensation 
payable, calculated in accordance with the guidelines set out in the ZDA Act.  
 
There is an argument that could be made that since the Constitution does not 
preclude the guarantee by the state of greater compensation in specific 
instances, the LAA simply sets out the minimum compensation to which any 
person whose property is expropriated, is entitled as required by the 
Constitution, and that the ZDA Act can therefore provide for greater 
compensation for investors. 
 
This position could then well be clarified by a proviso75 in the LAA that the 
provisions therein relating to the calculation of compensation, are subject to 
those provisions in other legislation76 that provide for [more] favourable 
compensation. 
 
The apparent disconnect between the two compensation provisions under the 
ZDA Act and the LAA, renders its guidance for [foreign] investors on the 
legal position with respect to property expropriation in Zambia, uncertain. 
 
The following chapter will demonstrate how LAP has relied on the 
constitutional provisions relating to property protection as a fundamental 
                                                            
75 Such a proviso would have to be by way of amendment to the LAA as it was enacted before the ZDA. 
76 Including the ZDA Act. 
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right in Zambia, in its dispute with the Zambian government. The 
inadequacies of the protections offered by the Constitution will be highlighted 
in the discussion of the various applications that have been commenced by 
LAP before the Zambian courts. 
 
It will also be shown how LAP has argued against the government, that the 
procedures laid down by the LAA for the expropriation of property, were not 
properly followed by the latter, therefore rendering the expropriation of the 






3. EXPROPRIATION OF SHARES OWNED AND HELD BY LAP GREENN OF 
LIBYA IN ZAMTEL BY THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT  
 
3.1 Basis for the expropriation of the LAP GreenN owned shares in Zamtel 
3.1.1 Findings of the Commission of Inquiry appointed to look into the 
privatisation of Zamtel77 
A Commission of Inquiry (the “Commission”) was established to determine 
how the sale of the shares in Zamtel to LAP GreenN (“LAP”) was conducted, 
and to ascertain whether all the requisite procedures relating to the sale were 
complied with. 78  
 
It is worth stating at the outset that it is highly unlikely, based on the various 
statements issued by the government prior to the setting up of the 
Commission intimating strongly that the sale of Zamtel shares would be 
reversed, that the latter could have reached a different conclusion than it did; 
primarily that the sale was improper and that it should be reversed. There is a 
strong argument, based on a reading of the Report of the Commission, that 
the ‘evidence’79 relied on by the Commission was selective so to support only 
a conclusion that the sale of the shares was illegal or improper.  
The main recommendation of the Commission was that all agreements 
relating to the sale of Zamtel to LAP be terminated and that there should be 
                                                            
77 The Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the President in October of 2011 and was chaired by the 
Minister of Justice. 
78 Terms of Reference of the Commission Report to H.E the President of the Republic of Zambia, Mr Michael 
Chilufya Sata of the Commission of Inquiry into the sale of Zamtel (2011) 13, available at 
http://www.lusakatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/zamtelfinalreport.pdf , accessed on 23 July, 2013. 
  
79 Namely Appendix II of the Report which contains the list of documents perused by the Committee (pp 81-84), 
Appendix IV of the Report which contains the oral submissions made to the Committee by those parties invited 
to give submissions by the former (pp 86-94) and Appendix VII which contains the written submissions made to 




[immediate] return of all the shares acquired by LAP in the former.80 The 
recommendation by the Commission was largely based on its finding that the 
price at which Zamtel was sold showed that it was “grossly undervalued” and 
that “the government paid more than it received”. The Commission’s further 
finding was that the effect of the ‘gross undervaluation’ was that the 
government had in essence given the 75 per cent shareholding in Zamtel to 
LAP, as a gift.81  
 
In reaching its conclusion and making the above recommendation, the 
Commission in its Report relied entirely on the apparent improper valuation 
of the fixed assets of Zamtel by a valuation company that was engaged by the 
previous government.82 The Commission was of the view that the improper 
valuation83 of the assets by the said company led to an undervaluation of 
Zamtel’s assets. There is no basis (other than the claim of the impropriety of 
the valuation), on a reading of the Report of the Commission, upon which the 
latter came to a conclusion that there had been an undervaluation of the fixed 
assets of Zamtel, leading to the sale of the 75 per cent of shares therein to LAP 
at undervalue.  
 
It is also noteworthy that the apparent undervaluation of the shares in Zamtel 
was a matter entirely within the preserve of the government which had 
appointed the valuation company and therefore, one for which LAP could not 
be held accountable. In view of the serious nature of an expropriation, 
                                                            
80 As stated in the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry in their Report to the President. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Summary of the Technical Committee Key Findings: Valuation of Zamtel Assets/Business Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the sale of Zamtel 6. 
83 According to a statement made to the Zambian Parliament by the Minister of Transport and Communications 
Hon. Dora Siliya, MP on 13 February 2009 on the engagement of the company appointed to undertake the 
valuation of Zamtel, namely RP Capitol Group, the valuation method used was that of a discounted cash flow. 
E. Shapiro et al Modern Methods of Valuation (2009) at 35, a discounted cash flow (DCF) method of valuation 
is a method for determining the current value of a company using future cash flows adjusted for time value.  
This is conceivably the valuation method that was criticised by the Commission as being improper. However, 
the Report does not relate the stated method of valuation actually undertaken by the company, that is, DCF, to 
that of the valuation of the fixed assets referred to therein. Furthermore, Shapiro states that what is essential to 
determine in valuation, is the market price of the subject matter; that is, what a willing buyer would pay a 
willing seller in an arm’s length transaction. This important aspect of valuation was not considered by the 
Commission in its critiquing of the valuation of the Zamtel assets and thus there is a strong force in the 
argument that the former undertook a superficial analysis of the said valuation. 
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particularly one of significant commercial investment such as that made by 
LAP in Zamtel, the apparent undervaluation of assets was not a sound basis 
for expropriating the shares from LAP- at least not by trying to impute some 
impropriety on the part of the latter for purchasing ‘under-valued’ shares. 
 
It is further interesting to note that nowhere in the Report of the Commission, 
was LAP given an opportunity to lead evidence that either supported or 
dispelled the findings of the former on the various issues relating to the 
apparent impropriety of the sale of the said shares to the latter. The basic 
tenents of natural justice require that the party against whom a claim is made 
and against whom a decision will ultimately be made, be given an 
opportunity to be heard. This important aspect seems to have been over-
looked by the Commission in its determination of the manner in which the 
sale of assets occurred. 
 
3.1.2 Expropriation of the shares pursuant to the Lands Acquisition Act 
Following the main recommendation of the Commission as highlighted 
above, the government, through the Attorney General of Zambia, served a 
notice84 on LAP of the government’s intention to expropriate the shares held 
in Zamtel by the latter. The notice served to LAP on the 23rd day of January in 
2011 purported to simultaneously give notice to LAP of the intention of the 
President to expropriate its shares in Zamtel, and notice for the former to 
“yield possession” of the shares to the government on the 24th day of January 
2011.   
It is submitted in this regard that there was no reasonable notice period that 
was afforded to LAP particularly in light of the ‘property’ sought to be 
expropriated by the government. It is inconceivable that the legislature could 
have sanctioned the expropriation of property from owners thereof, without 
affording the latter a reasonable notice period within which to properly hand 
                                                            
84 A Notice of intention to acquire property and a Notice to yield up possession as required by sections 5 and 6 
respectively, of the Lands Acquisition Act. See 2.1.2 above: “Procedure relating to the expropriation of 
property in Zambia”. 
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over their property to the state. The reasonableness of a notice period would 
obviously vary depending on the circumstances of each case. It is expected 
that in the case of a substantial investment by a foreign investor into a major 
company such as Zamtel, a notice period requiring the former to give up its 
majority shareholding in the latter within a day of learning of the 
government’s intention to expropriate the said shares is unreasonable. 
 
In terms of the “Notice of intention to acquire property” served on LAP, it 
was stated therein that the President had resolved that it was in the public 
interest to expropriate the shares held by the former in Zamtel.85 Although 
there is no requirement under the Lands Acquisition Act (the Act 
empowering the expropriation) for the government to state the public interest 
it seeks to achieve by the expropriation, it is argued that there should exist a 
genuine public interest or purpose for which the expropriation is undertaken. 
 
In this regard, although such public interest may not (in the absence of an 
express statement by the government on the interest sought to be advanced 
by the expropriation) be immediately apparent to the public, it should at least 
be deductible from the events surrounding the expropriation and the 
[potential] benefit that it would have for the public. As pointed out above, one 
of the main contentions of the government prior to the serving of the requisite 
notice on LAP was that the shares in Zamtel were under-valued resulting in 
the former not having paid sufficient consideration therefor. If the public 
interest sought to be advanced or protected was the payment of sufficient 
consideration for the said shares, this could surely have been achieved by 
other less drastic means such as by re-negotiating the relevant transaction 
documents to require LAP to pay more consideration for the shares, or to 
allow the government to acquire more shareholding in Zamtel from LAP, 
without the government having to pay consideration for such acquisition of 
shares from LAP. 
 
                                                            
85 As provided for by Section 5 of the Lands Acquisition Act. 
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Another point to note relating to the public interest factor of the expropriation 
is the fact that Zamtel provides essential telecommunication services to the 
Zambian public and that the proper operation and management thereof is 
vital in order to satisfy the important public purpose of providing those 
services. However, immediately prior to the privatisation of Zamtel and the 
acquisition of majority shareholding in the company by LAP, the former was 
on the brink of insolvency and had lost a large number of subscribers due to 
its operational inefficiencies86. The privatisation of Zamtel was therefore 
accepted as the most effective way through which the company’s operations 
could be strengthened, to allow for the company to serve the important public 
purpose of providing effective and efficient telecommunication services to the 
Zambian public.87  
 
It is therefore logical to conclude in this regard, that the greater public 
purpose was actually served by the sale of the majority shares in the company 
to LAP, in so far as the latter was able to overcome the challenges that were 
facing the company prior to the decision of the government to privatise it. 
Furthermore, it might be argued that returning full ownership and 
management of Zamtel to the very government which had caused the 
company to face the operational challenges and potential insolvency as 
described above would actually be contrary to the public interest. 
 
It is interesting to note that although it is clear that the requisite notices served 
to LAP under the auspices of the Lands Acquisition Act were as a direct 
consequence of the findings and recommendations of the Commission of 
Inquiry88, no wrong-doing was alleged on the part of LAP in the said notices. 
The only contention in the notice was that it was “desirable and in the interest of 
the Republic” for the shares to be expropriated. It is accepted that an illegality 
                                                            
86 This was according to the Ministerial statement made to the Zambian parliament by the Minister of 
Communications and Transport on 7 August, 2009 on the partial sale of Zamtel at p 4.   
87 Ibid, at 2. 
88 The findings and recommendations intimated strongly, wrong-doing on the part of LAP and more particularly 
in the form of corruption in collusion with the former ruling government. It is noteworthy however that no 
wrongdoing was expressly alleged against LAP by the Commission. 
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such as corruption by one or both parties to a transaction, would taint the 
transaction and if this was the allegation (which would have to be proved 
against LAP), the government could well have been justified in reversing the 
sale of the majority shares in Zamtel to LAP.  
 
A claim of corruption on the part of an investor against which a state had 
expropriated investment assets was well illustrated in the case of World Duty 
Free Co. Ltd v Republic of Kenya89in which the Kenyan government was alleged 
to have unlawfully expropriated the applicant’s investment. However, it came 
to light that the investor had obtained the relevant contract by bribing the 
then ruling Kenyan President. Kenya successfully argued for the case against 
it to be dismissed on the basis that corruption clearly violated international 
public policy as well as Kenyan law and that the investor was not entitled to 
maintain any of its pleaded claims. In the context of the expropriation by the 
Zambian government of LAP’s shares in Zamtel, the actions of the 
government could well have been justified if there was a clear and proven 
case of corruption on the part of LAP in procuring the shares.  
 
The above discussion makes a strong case for the unlawfulness or at the very 
least arbitrariness of the expropriation of LAP’s 75 per cent shares validly and 
legally held in Zamtel, by the Zambian government. The events and 
statements by the government preceding and following the expropriation of 
the shares strongly point to the fact that the expropriation was largely driven 
by extraneous political factors; largely, the current government’s disapproval 
of the former government. 
 
3.2 Litigation proceedings relating to the dispute between LAP and the 
government before the Zambian courts 
3.2.1 Judicial review proceedings 
                                                            
89 ICSID Case No. ARB/02/08 Award February 6, 2007. 
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Following the expropriation of the shares by the government as described 
above, LAP immediately sought legal redress before the Zambian courts to 
try to preserve its ownership of the shares in Zamtel.90 The first main 
application that it made before the courts was one for judicial review91 of the 
government’s decision to expropriate the shares.   
 
In the application for judicial review92 , LAP contended in the main that the 
government’s decision to expropriate the shares was ultra vires and illegal93 
that the expropriation did not meet the procedural requirements94 of the 
Lands Acquisition Act, that LAP was not given the opportunity to be heard 
regarding the expropriation and finally that the government’s decision was 
arbitrary and unreasonable.95 
 
Two months following the commencement of judicial review proceedings by 
LAP however, the company decided to discontinue96 the proceedings that 
were before the High Court. The court did not therefore have the opportunity 
to make rulings on the contentions of LAP against the state as raised in its 
application. There was no reason advanced by LAP as to why it was 
withdrawing the judicial review proceedings .However, it can be deduced 
that the reason for the withdrawal of the proceedings could have been 
motivated by an ‘appreciation’ by LAP of the nature of judicial review and the 
inherent limitations of the redress that can be sought as well as the orders that 
may be given by a court in such an action. For example, any finding of the 
court in judicial review would have related only to the propriety or lack 
                                                            
90 J. Ngoma “LAP vows to fight for Zamtel” The Post 8 January 2012, 4. 
91 The proceedings were commenced on 31 January 2012 under cause number 2012/HPC/0039. In accordance 
with the rules of Zambian High Court procedure, LAP had first needed to seek leave of the court prior to it 
commencing judicial review proceedings against the government. The requisite leave was granted by the court 
on 10 February 2012. 
92The application was made through a Statement of Action and Originating of Notice of Motion which was filed 
into the Principal Registry of the High Court on 12 February, 2012. 
93 LAP argued specifically that the expropriation of shares was not contemplated by the LAA albeit the 
reference to the expropriation of “property of any description”. This according to LAP is evidenced by the 
overwhelming reference to ‘land’ in the LAA and that this therefore showed the intention of Parliament when 
drafting the Act to limit its application to the expropriation of land. For that reason, LAP reasoned that the 
government acted ultra vires and illegally in expropriating the shares by means of the LAA. 
94 Op cit 84. 
95 At paragraph 3.1.1 of the Originating Notice of Motion for judicial review proceedings. 
96 A Notice of discontinuance was filed into the Principal Registry of the High Court on 20 March 2012. 
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thereof of the procedure used by the government in deciding to expropriate 
the LAP-owned shares in Zamtel. Even in the event that the court found that 
the government did not follow the right procedure in expropriating the 
shares, the court might simply have ordered the government to go back and 
follow the right procedure.97 The court would not, in judicial review, make a 
determination on the merits of the government’s decision to expropriate the 
shares from LAP. Thus a claim by LAP that the expropriation was illegal or 
politically motivated or indeed not for a public purpose, would be 
inappropriate in judicial review proceedings as the court would not be able to 
pronounce itself on such matters which would directly relate to the merits of 
the dispute between the parties.  
 
In the context of the expropriation of its shares, it could be argued that LAP 
would conceivably desire a determination by the court that the government’s 
decision to expropriate the shares was improper or illegal and that the said 
shares should therefore be returned to the former. In the alternative, LAP 
would conceivably be claiming pecuniary relief such as compensation or 





3.2.2 Constitutional Petition 
Following its discontinuance of the judicial review proceedings against the 
government, LAP filed a constitutional petition98 in which it primarily sought  
to protect its constitutional right to property ownership of the shares99. In the 
                                                            
97 If the court were to conceivably so order, it would be unlikely that the government would reverse its decision 
to expropriate the shares but would simply  do so by following the right procedure as directed by the 
empowering statutory provisions, which would leave LAP in the same position as before it commenced the 
proceedings. 
98 The Constitutional Petition was filed into the Principal Registry of the High Court on 19 March 2012 under 
cause number 2012/HP/0287. The Petition, which is LAP’s main action against the government before the 
Zambian courts, has not yet been finally determined and the proceedings are therefore ongoing. 
99 Pursuant to Articles 11 and 16 of the Constitution, which provide respectively for the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms (including the right to property ownership and non-discrimination) and  that 
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Petition, LAP is seeking several declarations from the court on the 
government’s decision to expropriate the property. 
 
LAP inter alia seeks a declaration that the government’s decision was null and 
void as it was in contravention of the Constitution and the Lands Acquisition 
Act. It is further seeking a declaration that the procedure used by the 
government to expropriate the shares was unlawful and that the court should 
therefore order the former to return the expropriated shares to LAP. Further 
still, LAP is seeking an order of prohibition to prevent the government from 
interfering in the 75 per cent equity interest of the former in Zamtel.  In the 
alternative to the above orders and declarations that is seeks, LAP is seeking 
an order for compensation of its expropriated shares, to be calculated at the 
market value of the shares at the date of the expropriation. The hearing of the 
petition is ongoing and thus the issues raised therein have not been finally 
determined. 
 
It is interesting to note that recently, the court ruled in favour of an 
application by LAP to have the petition heard in a neutral country.100  The 
reason advanced by LAP in the application101 was that its witnesses had been 
intimidated by government officials and that there was a real likelihood that 
they would continue to be intimidated during trial. In opposing the 
application102, the government contended that LAP had not cited any rule in 
support of its application and it was therefore not supported by law. 
 
The court in allowing the application stated that the government did not deny 
or challenge the LAP’s allegations regarding the intimidation of its witnesses 
and that it was therefore led to the conclusion that the allegations were true.103 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
there is to be no expropriation of property except in accordance with an Act of Parliament which provides for 
the payment of adequate compensation, . 
100 A Ruling on the application was delivered on 19 February 2013. The High Court ruled that the matter be 
heard in the United Kingdom. 
101 Ex parte application to adduce evidence by alternative means.  
102 The government filed an Affidavit in Opposition into the Principal Registry of the High Court on 19 January. 
2013. 
103 Paragraph 26 of the Ruling. 
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In response to the state’s contention that the application was not supported by 
any law, the court found that there was no prohibition against the receiving of 
evidence abroad and that as a result, it was not precluded from allowing the 
application made by LAP.104 
 
The government has appealed105 the court’s decision to allow the application 
by LAP. The appeal has not yet been determined by the Supreme Court and 
thus it remains to be seen whether the High Court’s decision to allow the 
application will be upheld.  
 
It is commendable that the High Court in the first place allowed the 
application, particularly in light of the fact that there is no express rule or 
provision of the law that provides for the determination of disputes over 
which the Zambian courts have jurisdiction, to be heard before the courts of 
another country. The court’s ruling in this regard does at least point to some 
measure of independence on the part of the court in determining the dispute 
and may provide some assurance that the determination of the issues raised 





3.2.3 Order for interim relief 
Following the filing of its constitutional petition before the High Court, LAP 
sought an order for interim relief106 from the High Court, directing the 
government not to deal further with the expropriated shares until the petition 
had been finally determined. 
 
                                                            
104 Paragraph 32 of the Ruling 
105 In a Notice of Appeal filed into the Supreme Court on 26 February 2013. 
106 Order for Interim Relief filed into the Principal Registry of the High Court on 22 March, 2012. 
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LAP argued107 that the government had on several occasions since the 
expropriation, made known its intentions of re-selling the shares to third 
parties. In particular it was submitted, the government had stated that it 
intended to restructure ownership of Zamtel to ensure that Zambian citizens 
owned the bulk of the shares therein. LAP further argued that if the shares 
were transferred to third parties and the High Court ruled in favour of the 
government returning ownership of the shares to LAP, the proceedings 
would be rendered academic as the shares would no longer be in the 
possession of the government. 
 
In opposing the order for interim relief, the government submitted that the 
correct procedure under Zambian law was that the main application before 
the courts had to be determined before an order was given, for the purposes 
of enforcing or securing the provisions of the applications. The government 
argued that even in the event that LAP was entitled to interim relief, damages 
would be an adequate remedy108 if the High Court found in favour of the 
latter. The government argued in this regard that the claim for compensation 
made by LAP (in the constitutional petition) to be calculated at the market 
value of the shares was in essence a claim for damages and thus LAP would 
in any case be satisfied with such an order (for compensation or damages), in 
the event that the shares were not returned to it. The main argument made by 
the government and on which the matter fell to be determined, was whether 
the order for interim relief sought by LAP was in effect an order for an 
injunction against the state.109 
 
                                                            
107 In the Affidavit in opposition. 
108 The Zambian Supreme Court case of Hondling Xing Xing Building Company v Zamcapital Enterprises 
Limited 2010/HP/439, is authority for the proposition that an injunction (which the government argued was in 
essence an order for interim relief) will usually not be granted where damages will be an alternative and 
adequate remedy to the ‘injury’ complained of if the applicant succeeded in the main action.  
109 Affidavit in Opposition to Summons for an Order of Interim Relief at paragraph 18 
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An injunction against the state cannot be obtained by virtue of the State 
Proceedings Act110 and the government therefore argued that the relief being 
sought by LAP was therefore not tenable at law. LAP argued that the order 
for interim relief was not an injunction but was rather akin to the relief sought 
in judicial review to “stay or defer the continued implementation of an 
administrative decision until the determination of the matter”111. 
 
 The court by referring to various sources that provided meaning to the words 
used by LAP in its application for the order, concluded that the relief sought 
by the latter was “no more than an ingenious application for an injunction against 
the state”112 and that it could therefore not grant LAP the relief it sought, by 
virtue of the prohibition in the State Proceedings Act. The court went on 
further to state that even in the [unlikely] event that the application by LAP 
did not amount to an injunction against the state, the damages sought by LAP 
in the petition in the form of compensation would be adequate as a remedy in 
the event that LAP succeeded in its petition.  The court ruled that it would not 
be impossible to determine all the damages to which LAP would be entitled if 
the constitutional petition was determined in its favour, and that the existence 
of that fact did not therefore warrant the granting of the order sought by 
LAP.113 The order for interim relief sought by LAP was therefore dismissed. 
 
The court’s ruling in this regard may suggest that in the event that it finds in 
favour of LAP in the petition, an order reversing the expropriation is unlikely 
and that perhaps an order for compensation is more likely to be granted. 
                                                            
110 Chapter 71 of the Laws of Zambia. Section 16 thereof provides that in any proceedings against the state, 
where the relief sought is an injunction, a court shall not grant an injunction…. “but may in lieu thereof make an 
order declaratory of the parties”. 
111 Affidavit in Support of Summons for an Order of Interim Relief at paragraph 21. 
112 As stated by the Hon. Mr. Justice Wood at paragraph 14 of the Ruling. 





4. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW RESOLUTION OF 
INVESTMENT EXPROPRIATION DISPUTES 
Having considered the domestic proceedings commenced by LAP against the 
government in the preceding chapter, and the possible limitations in the 
actions that may be validly commenced by an investor114 and the orders115 
that it may seek from the courts within the existing framework of the 
Zambian law, it is necessary to consider whether the international legal 
framework for the resolution of investment disputes provides investors with 
an additional avenue, free of the limitations highlighted in the previous 
chapter.  
Further, and as has been evidenced by an application sought by LAP before 
the High Court116 to have the constitutional petition heard in a neutral 
country (for the reason that there has been improper influence exerted over 
the domestic proceedings by the state or its elements to the detriment of LAP), 
it is vitally important for investors to have recourse to a neutral regional or 
international adjudicating forum at which host states will be unable to 
exercise any improper influence over the determination of a dispute with an 
investor.  
The discussion hereunder will also involve a consideration of the 
international law requirements for lawful property expropriation. These 
requirements have crystallised into what is sufficiently referred to as the 
customary international law on property expropriation and have been 
restated in various forms in different jurisdictions. However, the Zambian law 
                                                            
114Having regard to the limitations relating to the commencement of important proceedings by an affected 
property owner such as judicial review proceedings against the government discussed at 2.1.1. 
115 This issue is illustrated at 3.2.1 where the limitations relating to the remedies that can be validly sought by an 
affected party in judicial review are highlighted. A further example to the limited orders that may be made 
against the government is discussed at 3.2.3 above relating to the granting of interim relief to an affected party, 
particularly against the state (in accordance with the provisions of the State Proceedings Act) for the reason that 
damages would be an adequate remedy. 
116 An ex parte application to adduce evidence by alternative means discussed at 3.2.2 above. 
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requirements for property expropriations as stated by the Constitution117 and 
the LAA118 have not adequately adopted these requirements with the result 
that there is insufficient protection of property rights for investors in Zambia. 
The potential consequence of this inadequacy in the protection of investors’ 
property rights could be that more investors, at least those in Zambia who 
may find themselves in LAP’s position will seek recourse within the 
international law framework. The discussion will therefore serve the useful 
purpose of informing investors of the appropriate for a before which they 
could bring their claims against states and the procedure that must be 
followed in bringing the said claims.  
The starting point in achieving a discussion encompassing the issues 
highlighted above will be to set out a general overview of the resolution of 
investment disputes by international (including regional) tribunals. The 
discussion here will be premised on the existence of disputes arising out of 
international investment agreements or trade treaties governing the 
investment relationship between the parties, where it has been agreed that 
any disputes arising will be determined by arbitration before tribunals 
selected by the parties. This is due to the fact that most major investments are 
regulated by such agreements or treaties and the determination of investment 
disputes (such as those relating to unlawful expropriations) provide a strong 
reference point for the determination of those investment disputes not 
regulated by such treaties. 
For the reason that investment agreements are not always regulated by 
investment treaties, it is necessary to consider in turn, an identified regional 
and international tribunal that have jurisdiction to hear investment disputes 
and the remedies that may be awarded to investors by those tribunals, where 
there is no guiding investment treaty or other international investment 
agreement pursuant to which the dispute may be determined, and whether 
                                                            
117 Refer to the discussion on the ‘property clause’ of the Zambian Constitution at 2.1.1 above 
118 Refer to the discussion at 2.1.2 above 
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such remedies are ultimately adequate for the protection of investors’ 
property rights in host states.  
 
4.1 General approach to state expropriations by international tribunals 
4.1.1 Expropriations in breach of investment agreements 
Investment agreements between states and foreign investors tend to be 
governed by international investment agreements (IIAs), bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), multilateral investment treaties (MITs) or preferential trade 
agreements and not by the existing domestic laws of the host state. These 
treaty based agreements are preferable to ordinary contracts governed by the 
domestic laws of host states  because they provide a clear and neutral 
regulatory framework within which investment agreements are concluded.  
In particular, they offer investors with strong guarantees with respect to inter 
alia fair and equitable treatment, and protection from expropriation.119  
 
With respect to the protection from expropriation, a large number of IIAs, 
BITs or MITs provide that the contracting state will not expropriate property 
unless for a public purpose, in accordance with a law of general application 
and upon payment of adequate or appropriate compensation.120  An 
expropriation that does not conform to the requirements as stated is therefore 
a breach of the treaty obligations and falls to be resolved by the relevant 
dispute mechanisms agreed to by the parties.  
 
It follows that if a tribunal or other adjudicating forum resolving a treaty 
dispute finds that a particular expropriation is in breach of the stated 
requirements and is therefore unlawful, it should make an appropriate order 
against the expropriating state. The most common orders given by tribunals 
                                                            
119 G Chien Yen The Sharp Edge of International Investment Agreements: Expropriation and Dispute 
Settlement, (2011) 2. 
120 There are several variations to the wording that may be used in this regard. These are however the general 
requirements relating to the legality of expropriations.  G Chien op cit 115 at 5. 
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against states in this regard are pecuniary in nature121 and more particularly, 
in the form of compensation. 
 
Further, to the extent that an unlawful expropriation is a breach of agreement 
between the state and an investor122, it is logical to conclude that tribunals 
should be able to make other orders  against the state that relate to breach of 
contract, such as specific performance. An order for specific performance 
would naturally have the effect of nullifying an unlawful expropriation by the 
state as the latter would be required to perform under the agreement as it 
would have prior to the expropriation. 
 
Although the majority of cases123 that have dealt with unlawful 
expropriations have limited the orders against the erring states to pecuniary 
compensation124, in the landmark case of Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company 
and California Asiatic Oil Company v Libyan Arab Republic (TOPCO), the sole 
arbitrator determined that restitutio in integrum was the preferred remedy in 
international law and he therefore ordered the Libyan government to resume 
performance under the relevant concession agreement. The conclusion on the 
appropriate remedy arrived at in that case was however premised on the 
finding that the arbitration was directly governed by customary international 
law125 and not by domestic law. It may therefore be that an arbitral tribunal 
that solely applies domestic law to an investment dispute due perhaps to a 
choice of law clause by the parties would not give an order having the effect 
of a restitutio in integrum as was the case in TOPCO.  
                                                            
121   Schreuer notes that ICSID Tribunals almost always grant relief in the form of pecuniary damages. C. 
Schreuer ‘Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration’ (2004) 4, 20 Arbitration International 325. See also, 
J. Cantegreil ‘The Audacity of the Texaco/Calasiatic Award: René-Jean Dupuy and the Internationalization of 
Foreign Investment Law’ (2011) 22, 2  European Journal of International Law 442.   
122 Where a clause in the agreement provides that the state will not carry out an ‘unlawful expropriation’ or more 
accurately one that is not in accordance with the laws of the state governing expropriations. 
123 The leading cases in this regard are the Libyan oil cases between 1971 and 1974. British Petroleum v Libyan 
Arab Republic 53 ILR 297 ( 1973); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company 
v Libyan Arab Republic 53 ILR  389 (1977) and Libyan American Oil Co. v Libyan Arab Republic 20 ILM 1 
(1981). 
124J. Cantegreil op cit 119 at 443.  
125 A. Norton and M. Patrick ‘Law of the Future or a Law of the Past- Modern Tribunals and the International 
Law of Expropriation’ (1991) 85 The American Journal of International Law 480. The arbitrator in TOPCO, in 




4.1.2 Expropriations in breach of international customary law 
The majority of IIAs, BITs or MITs provide that states may only expropriate 
investments if the takings are for a public purpose, in accordance with due 
process of the law and accompanied by appropriate compensation126. To these 
requirements is also often added one that the takings must be non-
discriminatory.  The above requirements have crystallised sufficiently to 
represent what is now the customary international law127 on expropriation.128 
 
Tribunals adjudicating upon international investment disputes relating to the 
legality of an expropriation, particularly where the agreement between the 
parties does not refer to the requirements for a valid expropriation or where 
international customary law on expropriation is directly applicable, will 
therefore first have to determine whether there has been an expropriation, 
and after it has so determined, assess the conduct of the expropriating state 
against the requirements stated above. 
 
The most contentious requirements are usually those relating to the public 
purpose or interest for which expropriations are made and the appropriate or 
adequate compensation payable. 
 
The public purpose requirement is recognised by most legal systems and will 
usually give rise to a similar discussion in each system.  The assessment of 
                                                            
126 Compensation is deemed appropriate if it is adequate, effective and prompt.  World Bank Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 6, available at http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf, accessed 
on 12 November, 2013. 
127 This is the “modified” customary international law on expropriations, particularly with respect to the 
requirement for the payment of compensation. The requirements for compensation were first laid out by United 
States Sectary of State Cordell Hull in 1938 and became known as the Hull doctrine;-namely that [in addition to 
the other requirements for a lawful expropriation], compensation should be prompt, adequate and effective. The 
doctrine has however found less support over the years, particularly amongst developing countries and the 
requirement has been commonly reformulated as the right to receive ‘appropriate compensation’. This standard 
is less onerous and allows states to for instance, take into account its relevant laws and regulations and all other 
circumstances that it considers pertinent in offering compensation for the expropriation. K. Smith et al The law 
of Compensation for Expropriated Companies and the Valuation Methods used to achieve that Compensation, 
2001, available at http://users.wfu.edu/palmitar/Law&Valuation/Papers/2001/Smith.htm accessed on 12 
November, 2013.  
128 UNCTAD, DIAE and IA (7/2011). UNCTAD Series on International Investment Agreements II 27.  
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whether a taking has been made in the public interest in accordance with 
international customary law will sometimes, and rightly so, involve a 
determination of whether it has been made in pursuance of a legitimate 
public welfare objective, as opposed to a purely private gain or illicit end129 
which serves only to benefit the government’s political interests and not those 
of the citizens. 
 
In ADC v Hungary130, the tribunal noted that a reference to ‘public interest’ 
required some genuine interest of the public and that “…if mere reference to 
public interest could magically put such interest into existence in order to satisfy the 
requirement, the requirement would be rendered meaningless as it would always be 
met”131. In BP v Libya132, the arbitrator held that the taking of a foreign oil 
company as an act of political retaliation did not qualify as a public purpose. 
The tribunal in that case concluded that the nationalisation of the company 
violated international law as it was made purely for extraneous political 
reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in character.133 It could be 
therefore, that a tribunal will not simply accept an expropriation as being for a 
public purpose simply because it is stated as such, and will assess the public 
purpose sought to be achieved by a state, before satisfying itself that the 
requirement has been met. 
 
 
4.2 Investor-state dispute settlement within the framework of the judicial 
organs of African regional institutions134 
4.2.1 Southern African Development Community  
The Southern African Development Community (SADC)135 is the principal 
framework for regional integration in southern Africa and its aims and 
                                                            
129 Ibid.  
130 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16. 
131 At paragraph 432. 
132 Supra n 9 . 
133 Schreuer op cit 5 at 329 
134 The Institutions that will be discussed are the Southern African Development Community, the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the African Union. 
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objectives are set out in the SADC Treaty. One of the objectives of SADC is to 
achieve economic growth and alleviate poverty136 and to this end, FDI is an 
important activity that seeks to achieve this goal within the region. It is noted 
that SADC is both a major recipient and provider of FDI in a diverse range of 
sectors.137  
 
To the extent that FDI is a means to achieve economic growth within the 
SADC region, it can be assumed that an act by a member state, such as an 
unlawful or arbitrary expropriation of a foreign investor’s assets, that has the 
effect of threatening FDI, is at least an indirect breach of an objective of the 
treaty, giving the institution or the relevant organ thereof, ‘jurisdiction’ to 
intervene in the state conduct complained of.138 
 
Within the framework of the current SADC Treaty, disputes fall to be 
adjudicated by the SADC Tribunal139 (the “Tribunal”) which is the judicial 
wing of SADC. The matters relating to the composition, powers, functions 
and other matters concerning the governing of the Tribunal are prescribed in 
a Protocol140.  
 
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction extends inter alia to the adjudication of disputes 
between member states and between natural or legal persons and member 
states.141 It would appear, prima facie, that a foreign investor (which in the 
context of the discussion is a legal person) who at least has an establishment 
within the member state has locus standi to commence proceedings against a 
member state with which it is in dispute, before the Tribunal. The right of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
135 SADC was established by the Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, at 
the Summit of Heads of State of Government on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. 
136 As provided for in Article 5 (1) (a) of the SADC Treaty. 
137 D. Zampini, ‘Developing a balanced framework for FDI in SADC: a decent work perspective’-Chapter 5 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 2008, 1. 
138 In terms of the Protocol on the Tribunal of the SADC, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over all disputes and all 
applications referred to it in accordance with the Treaty and the Protocol and which relate to the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty. 
139 The Tribunal is established by Article 9 of the SADC Treaty. The Tribunal which came into operation after 
the requisite Protocol was signed has been disbanded and thus the discussion is premised on the structure, 
jurisdiction and powers of enforcement of the Tribunal as contemplated by the Protocol. 
140 The Protocol establishing the Tribunal was signed by SADC on 7 August, 2000. 
141 Article 15(1) of the Protocol. 
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person to bring a dispute before the Tribunal is however qualified: such 
person can only approach the Tribunal after they have exhausted all local 
remedies in the member state.142 They are only able to approach the Tribunal 
directly if it there are no effective domestic remedies available or if the 
proceedings thereunder are unduly prolonged.143 
 
A notable advantage to an investor of bringing a dispute before the Tribunal 
relates to the impartiality and independence of the judges appointed 
thereto144 . Once a judge is appointed, he is not a delegate of government or 
his own country.145 Furthermore, judges appointed to the Tribunal may not 
hold a political or administrative office in any other state for the tenure of 
their term at the Tribunal.146 This ensures that they are not unfairly influenced 
by any member states in the decisions that they reach. An investor therefore 
does not have to contend with judges, who may not, for political or other 
reasons, wish to decide against a state, as may be the case where the dispute is 
heard before the domestic courts. 
 
The above factors highlight how the current framework of the Tribunal147 
provides, to some extent, a reliable means for an investor to bring a dispute 
against the state in the context of regional law. However, there are some 
constraints to the Tribunal’s effectiveness in resolving disputes such as 
investment disputes, relating particularly to the enforcement of the Tribunal’s 
decisions against member states. 
 
Firstly, there is no express mention either in the Treaty or the Protocol on the 
status of the SADC law in the member states.148 This entails that there is still a 
possibility that national law will prevail over the Tribunal’s decisions, unless 
                                                            
142 Article 15 (2) of the Protocol. 
143 Ibid.  
144 Article 3(6) of the Protocol. 
145 O. Ruppel and F. Bangamwabo, The SADC Tribunal: a legal analysis of its mandate and role in regional 
intergration- Chapter 8Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 2008, 14.  
146 Ibid. 
147 As stated in the Protocol which has not as yet been amended.  
148 O. Ruppel and F. Bangamwabo op cit 147 at 21. 
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the national laws of the member state give recognition to the superior status 
of the SADC law149.   
 
The need for the SADC law, at least the law as it relates to the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal to determine disputes between states and other persons, to rank 
above national laws is imperative for the effective enforcing of the orders of 
the Tribunal against states. This is due to the fact that most domestic legal 
systems may not recognise the decisions of other jurisdictions or may have 
limitations regarding the enforcement of the orders made by the courts or 
tribunals in those jurisdictions.  
 
In Zambia for example, the decisions of ‘foreign’ courts or tribunals are 
enforceable using two principal methods. The first of these methods is in 
terms of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act150 by which the 
decisions of courts in countries which have a reciprocal arrangement for 
enforceability with Zambia are enforceable be mere registration.151 In terms of 
the second method which is outside the Act, the person in whose favour a 
decision is made would have to re-commence an action in a Zambian court 
and proceed using the judgment of the foreign court as a cause of action.152 
 
The above example of the Zambian position further illustrates the need for the 
SADC as a regional organisation to attain the status as a supra-national body 
which will require member states to allow for the superior recognition of the 
decisions of the Tribunal153 and the direct enforcement of the orders thereof, 
                                                            
149 Ibid. 
150 Chapter 76 of the Laws of Zambia 
151 The SADC as a regional organisation of states is not a “country” capable of entering into a reciprocal 
arrangement for the enforcement of foreign judgments in Zambia and thus the decisions of the Tribunal are not 
enforceable by registration in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, there is not yet a single 
country that has entered into such an arrangement with the Zambia. 
152 This was stated in the unreported Zambian Supreme Court case of Zanetta Nyendwa vs. Kenneth Paul 
Spooner 2009/HP/250 and re-confirmed by the High Court in the case of Attorney General v Dr Frederick 
Jacob Titus Chiluba and 7 others 2007/HP/FJ/004. 
153 M Hulse (2012) Silencing a Supranational Court: The Rise and Fall of the SADC Tribunal, available from 
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/25/silencing-a-supranational-court-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-sadc-tribunal/, accessed 
on 10 February, 2014. 
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so as to further assure investors of proper redress against unlawful state 
action.  
 
It has been submitted154 that in the context of community (regional) 
judgments, national courts should not have jurisdiction to decline to enforce 
them.155 The Protocol could therefore do well to provide that judgments of the 
Tribunal are to be directly enforceable in the member states against which 
they are made. This would inevitably require an amendment to the Treaty 
mandating member states to enact national legislation which would allow for 
the direct enforcement of the decisions of the Tribunal. 
 
The potential implication of the non-ranking of SADC law within the 
hierarchy of the legal systems of member states may create challenges for 
investors in their attempts to enforce decisions of the Tribunal against states 
before their respective domestic courts.   
 
Perhaps the biggest constraint to the effectiveness of the Tribunal and one 
which significantly impedes the protection of investors in investment 
disputes with states is the fact that the Tribunal has no power to impose any 
sanction against a state that defies an order or judgment thereof. Where an 
aggrieved party brings to the attention of the Tribunal the refusal of a state to 
comply with its decision, the Tribunal is required to refer the matter to the 
Summit156 for the latter to take appropriate action against the state.157 The 
Summit is empowered to determine whether or not it will impose sanctions, 
and if it will so impose sanctions, the type of sanctions that it will impose, on 
a case by case basis.158 
 
                                                            
154 By notable scholar Richard Frimpong Oppong. 
155 R F. Oppong ,‘Enforcing judgments of the SADC Tribunal in the domestic courts of member states’ Chapter 
7 Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 2010, 125. 
156 The Summit of the Heads of State or Government of SADC established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Treaty. 
157 Article 33(1) (a) of the Protocol. It is noteworthy however, that sanctions are to be imposed where a state has 
“persistently failed, without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed under the Treaty”. It is unclear therefore, 
whether a state that fails only once to comply with the provisions of the Treaty, even where such failure is of a 
serious nature, would have sanctions imposed against it by the Summit. 
158 Article 33 (2) of the Protocol. 
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Leaving the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with decisions of the 
Tribunal solely to the discretion of the Summit has inherent dangers. Firstly, it 
is inevitable that the Summit in making decisions will largely be guided and 
influenced by diplomacy and regime solidarity for the state concerned.159 It is 
therefore unlikely that it would readily impose any sanctions or at least 
sanctions that would be serious enough to serve as a future deterrent against 
disregarding orders of the Tribunal, to the state concerned or indeed other 
member states. 160 
 
Secondly, the Summit, in making its decisions regarding the imposition of 
appropriate sanctions, does not exclude the participation of the state against 
which the decision is to be made.161 The non-exclusion of the state concerned 
in the decision making process regarding possible sanctions, does not prevent 
that state from improperly influencing the other member states or at least a 
majority of them, through lobbying or other means, to vote against the 
imposition of any sanctions against it. 
 
The above point is well illustrated by the suspension and subsequent 
disbanding of the Tribunal that occurred in 2010 and 2012 respectively162. The 
suspension of the Tribunal followed a series of decisions taken against the 
Zimbabwe government by the Tribunal between the years 2007 and 2010163, 
most notably that of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Government of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe164.  
                                                            
159O. Ruppel and F. Bangamwabo op cit 147.  
160 The outcome of the Mike Campbell case discussed below (see fn 168) and the subsequent steps taken by the 
SADC Summit as a result of the Tribunal’s judgment is evidence of the fact that no sanctions will readily be 
imposed on a member state even when objectively viewed, the state has committed a wrongful or unlawful act 
that warrants the imposition of sanctions. 
161 Article 33 (2) of the Treaty simply provides that the Summit will decide appropriate sanctions on a case by 
case basis and states  nothing further regarding the participation of the state subject of the possible sanctions, in 
the decision making process. 
162 As provided in the Communique on the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of SADC 
held at Windhoek, Namibia on 20 May 2011 and the Final Communique of the 32nd Summit of SADC Heads of 
State and Government held at Maputo, Mozambique on August 18, 2012, respectively.  
163 Between this period, the SADC Tribunal adjudicated upon 20 cases which essentially involved claims of 
human rights abuses by the Government of Zimbabwe. Mike Campbell Foundation The SADC Tribunal: Set up, 
Scope, Review and Outcome:  Justice Denied, available at http://www.mikecampbellfoundation.com/page/sadc-
tribunal-background-scope-wti-review , accessed on 3 December, 2013. 




In that case, the applicants brought a claim before the Tribunal challenging 
the unlawful expropriation of its agricultural land by the Government, in 
breach of the latter’s obligations under the Treaty.  
 
Furthermore (and before the main matter was determined by the Tribunal), 
the applicant sought an interdict preventing the government evicting it from 
the land, pending determination of the matter by the Tribunal. The 
Government, however, defied the interdict and proceeded to brutally evict 
the applicants from the land in question. 
 
With respect to the interdict that was disregarded, an urgent application was 
brought by the applicants before the Tribunal, which in turn referred the non-
compliance by the Zimbabwe government with its order to the Summit, for 
the latter to take appropriate action165. No action in the form of imposition of 
sanctions or otherwise was however taken by the Summit against the 
government. 
 
When the main matter was concluded by the Tribunal, it ruled that the 
expropriation of the land was unlawful166 and in breach of the Treaty 
obligations. The Tribunal ordered inter alia that the government pay 
compensation to the applicants for the compulsory acquisition of their 
property.  
 
The Zimbabwe government ignored the orders of the Tribunal and instead 
sought to withdraw from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.167 Following its 
                                                            
165 This is in accordance with Article 32 (5) of the Protocol. 
166 The Tribunal in this regard grounded its findings on the fact that the expropriation was racially motivated and 
therefore a breach of Article 6 of the SADC Treaty. Furthermore, that the action of the Zimbabwe government 
was not in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law as well as equity, 
balance and mutual benefit as required by Article 4 of the Treaty.  O. Ruppel and F. Bangamwabo Monitoring 
Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook (2008), 5. 
167 On 7 August 2009, Zimbabwe’s Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa wrote to the Tribunal to inform it of 
Zimbabwe’s withdrawal therefrom, arguing that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over Zimbabwe and that 
Zimbabwe would no longer be bound by any of the former’s past or future judgments. Mike Campbell 
Foundation op cit 163.  
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withdrawal from the Tribunal, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on 
intense lobbying168 of other member states to support its position taken on the 
Tribunal.169 This resulted in the Summit’s decision to suspend the Tribunal 
and ultimately to disband it. 
 
The Protocol establishing the Tribunal has not been formally repealed by the 
Treaty. However, the disbanding of the Tribunal effectively brought its 
current existence to an end. At a recent SADC Summit meeting170, it was 
resolved that a new Protocol on the Tribunal should be renegotiated, but that 
its mandate should be confined to the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and 
Protocols relating to disputes between member states,.171 
 
The proposed structure and revised jurisdiction of the Tribunal effectively 
eliminates any possibility of a foreign investor having its investment dispute 
with a member state, determined by the Tribunal. An investor within a 
member state of the SADC region is therefore restricted to having their 
disputes heard by domestic courts, which restriction often poses a major 
disadvantage for the reasons highlighted above. 
 
4.3 Investor-state dispute resolution within the framework of international 
institutions 
4.3.1 International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States172 
Outside the regional legal framework, there exists no ‘international court’ 
which hears and determines investment disputes between states and foreign 
investors. Therefore, in the wider international context, such disputes fall to 
                                                            
168 The Zimbabwe Minister of Justice, Chinamasa, successfully lobbied his ministerial counterparts in other 
SADC countries to support Harare’s stance on the removal of the Tribunal. L. Nathan ‘The Disbanding of the 
SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale’ (November 2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 4 at 877.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Held on 18 August, 2013 in Lilongwe, Malawi. 
171 ‘SADC Tribunal’, available at http://www.sadc.int./about-sadc/sadc-institutons/tribun/ ,accessed on 3 
December, 2013.  
172 The Convention entered into force on 14 October, 1966. 
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be adjudicated largely by international arbitration tribunals, usually 
appointed by the parties in their investment agreement prior to the dispute 
arising. 
 
Recognising that investment disputes between investors and host states are 
most effectively resolved through arbitration173, the World Bank conceived a 
special forum for arbitrating investment disputes known as the International 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States (ICSID). 174 The ICSID (the “Centre”) has provided a 
platform where eligible states and foreign investors can bring their 
investment disputes to neutral arbitration tribunals which are constituted and 
administered in terms of the Centre’s arbitration proceedings. 175  
 
The Centre has jurisdiction over legal disputes arising directly out of an 
investment between a contracting state176 and a national of another 
contracting state, where the parties consent in writing to submit their dispute 
to the Centre.177 Where the parties have given their consent as required by the 
Convention, no party may withdraw it unilaterally.178The requirement of 
written consent by both parties before the Centre can assume jurisdiction 
merits some further comment. 
 
The wording of the Convention is unequivocal in requiring written consent of 
the parties, notwithstanding that it has jurisdiction over the parties by virtue 
of the state involved in the dispute being signatory to the ICSID Convention. 
In addition, the requirement that the parties consent in writing to their 
dispute being submitted to arbitration by the Centre does not state anything 
further on the procedure to be followed by the parties in giving the said 
                                                            
173 For the reason largely that investors may be discriminated against or receive some other unfair treatment 
before the local courts of a host state. 
174 L Reed et al Guide to ICSID Arbitration (2004) 2. 
175 Chapter IV of the ICSID Convention. 
176 There are currently 158 contracting states under the ICSID Convention,  available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/, accessed on 9 December, 2013. 




consent .179 It is reasonable to conclude  therefore, that the consent can be 
given in the investment agreement concluded by the parties, by way of a 
clause providing for arbitration by the Centre in the event of a dispute  
arising. 
 
‘Consent in writing’ may still also be given where the investment agreement 
does not provide for arbitration by the Centre, where the relevant investment 
laws of the host state or treaty under which the investment agreement was 
concluded, confer jurisdiction on the Centre.180 In such a case, the requirement 
for written consent by both parties is only ‘perfected’ when the investor 
writes to the state accepting the jurisdiction of the Centre (prior to the dispute 
arising) or where it brings a claim against the state to the Centre, after a 
dispute has arisen. 
 
The position is unclear where the state repeals the laws conferring jurisdiction 
on the Centre, after an investor has consented to the jurisdiction of the Centre 
by submitting a dispute thereto. Conceivably, if a state were to repeal the 
applicable laws in this manner, this would effectively amount to a unilateral 
withdrawal of consent which is prohibited. However, it is more than likely 
that if the request for arbitration submitted to the Centre has already been 
accepted, it would proceed with the arbitration irrespective of the state action 
against it. 
 
The arbitration tribunal to hear the dispute is required to be constituted by the 
Parties themselves181 or if they fail to do so within 90 days of submitting their 
dispute to the Centre, the Chairman thereof appoints arbitrators to constitute 
a tribunal. The tribunal that is appointed decides the dispute in accordance 
with the rules of law chosen by the parties.182 If the parties however fail to 
choose the law to govern the proceedings themselves, the tribunal is bound to 
                                                            
179 L. Reed et al op cit 174 at 35. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Article 37 of the ICSID Convention. 
182 Article 42(1). 
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apply the law of the contracting state party to the dispute and such other 
international laws as may be applicable.183 
 
The fact that the tribunal may apply the law of the host state in an investment 
dispute can prove manifestly unfair to an investor in certain situations, 
particularly where that law does not adequately protect the interests of the 
investor. Furthermore, the very reason that referring a dispute with the host 
state to the Centre is preferable for an investor is because the laws of the host 
state may be inadequate or ineffective in the first place. The Convention may 
have done well to elevate international customary law or some other neutral 
international law system (over the national law of the contracting state) to 
govern the proceedings, in such an event. 
 
Notwithstanding the above potential prejudice relating to the applicable law 
to an investor, the tribunal may determine the dispute ex aequo et bono184 if the 
parties so consent.185 The tribunal may in such a case therefore, refer to a 
neutral legal system. 
 
The award given by the tribunal after it has determined the dispute is binding 
on the parties and is not subject to appeal except in accordance with the 
Convention.186 Each contracting state is required to recognise an award 
rendered pursuant to the Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary 
obligations imposed by the award, as if the latter were a final judgment of a 
court in that state.187 
 
A question arises as to whether the reference to “pecuniary obligations 
imposed by the award” in the Convention188 limits the awards that may be 
given by a tribunal, to those that are pecuniary in nature. It has been 
                                                            
183 Ibid. 
184 According to Black’s Law Dictionary 6th ed. (1990) at 256, this refers to a judgment based on considerations 
of fairness, not on considerations of existing law.  
185 Article 42 (3).  
186 Article 53 (2) . 




submitted189 that the fact that ICSID tribunals have generally granted 
pecuniary relief rather than ordered specific performance, is not based on any 
fundamental restriction on their power to do so, but rather by the fact that 
investors almost always seem to frame their claims in monetary damages.190 
 
The statement by the International Court of Justice in the old authoritative 
case of Factory at Chorzow (Germany v Poland)191, provides authority for the 
proposition that tribunals may order non-pecuniary relief such as specific 
performance or restitution, particularly where there has been unlawful state 
conduct. In that case the court stated that “the essential principle contained in the 
notion of an illegal act as established by decisions of international tribunals, is that 
reparation must as far as possible wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had 
not been committed.”192 The reasoning of the court in this case is particularly 
significant in the context of unlawful state expropriations, in which investors 
more often than not would prefer to continue with their investment in the 
host state. 
 
The Centre’s tribunals have in the past ordered non-pecuniary awards or 
relief, particularly in the form of specific performance or injunctions where 
the claims related to unlawful expropriations.193 In the case of Enron v 
Argentina, the claimants argued that stamp taxes assessed by the government 
were tantamount to an expropriation, and that they should therefore be 
declared unlawful and annulled by the tribunal.194 The Argentine government 
objected to the Centre’s jurisdiction to grant the claimants’ relief by arguing 
that the tribunal could only make a finding that there was an illegal 
expropriation and award compensation if appropriate, but could not impede 
                                                            
189 By notable scholar, Christoph Schreuer, 
190 C. Schreuer Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration, Arbitration International Vol 4 No. 20, p 329. 
191 1928 P.C.I.J (Ser. A) No. 17 (Sept 13) 
192 Paragraph 125. 
193 Most notably the decisions of Antoine Geotz v Brundi 10 February ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2 2000 and that 
of Enron Corporation and Penderosa Assets, LP v Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 2007. 
194 Schreuer op cit 190 at 330. 
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an expropriation that fell within the ambit of state sovereignty.195 The 
claimants however argued that an ICSID award could deal with non-
pecuniary determinations, including specific performance and injunctions, 
and the tribunal agreed with them in this regard. The tribunal stated that 
based on its examination of the powers of international courts and tribunals 
to order measures concerning performance or injunction, it had the powers to 






4.3.2 ICSID Additional Facility Rules 
The Centre also has jurisdiction over disputes in terms of the Additional 
Facility Rules (the “Rules”) of the Convention.197 The Rules apply to 
investment disputes submitted to the Centre between parties, at least one of 
which is a contracting state. Thus, an investor who is not a national of a 
contracting state or who enters into an investment agreement with a state that 
is not a contracting state under the ICSID Convention, can still bring a dispute 
to be arbitrated under the auspices of the Centre, provided that the requisite 
mutual consent to the Centre’s jurisdiction is given by the state party. 
 
A distinguishing feature of the Rules (from disputes brought under the ICSID 
Convention), is that the parties must first seek the approval of the Secretary 
General of the Centre before their consent to the Centre having jurisdiction 
over their dispute, can be given effect to.198 If the parties consent to the 
jurisdiction of the Centre under the auspices of the Rules in their investment 
agreement, a copy of that agreement is required to be submitted to the 
                                                            
195 Ibid, 331. 
196 Ibid.  
197 Which were adopted by the Administrative Council of the ICSID in 2006. 
198 Article 4(1) of the Additional Facility Rules. 
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Secretary General and he thereafter must give his [further] consent to the 
Centre having jurisdiction over a dispute that may arise between the parties. 
 
The requirement for the Secretary General to give his consent seems counter 
intuitive for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that the Rules exist in the first place 
to provide an international investment arbitration platform for parties who do 
not qualify to have their investment disputes arbitrated under the main ICSID 
Convention, implies that the Centre has extended its jurisdiction to those 
parties if they so wish (and if they give their written consent), and that by the 
Rules, the Secretary General consents beforehand, to such parties bringing 
their disputes before the Centre.  
 
Secondly, and in the case of the requirement to submit an investment 
agreement that contemplates the jurisdiction of the Centre to the Secretary 
General for what would conceivably be an ‘assessment’ by him of the 
agreement and the  suitability of a dispute arising thereunder to arbitration 
under the Rules, does not seem essential or even necessary. A foreign investor 
who undertakes an investment in a state is usually sophisticated and 
understands clauses such as those relating to arbitration and the conditions 
under which it can institute a claim under the Rules against the host state, and 
the consequences thereof. The state party likewise is more than likely to 
understand the content of the Rules, and the instances in which a dispute can 
be brought to the Centre thereunder. In any event, the tribunal that is 
constituted to hear a dispute is competent to rule on whether it has 
jurisdiction to determine a particular dispute which is purported to be 
brought in terms of the Rules. 
 
Another point to note about the Rules is that the provisions of the ICSID 
Convention are not applicable thereto199 and that tribunals constituted under 
                                                            
199 Article 3 of the Rules. 
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the Rules cannot take advantage of the of the Convention’s self-contained 
provisions on recognition and enforcement of awards.200  
 
The Rules therefore have inherent limitations in providing investors with a 
relatively easy international platform to which they can bring their 
investment disputes. The apparent ‘discrimination’ in some of the terms and 
procedures of the Convention and the Rules, seems unwarranted and even 
unfair, particularly for those investors who may be nationals of contracting 
states and find themselves in the unfortunate position of being in an 
investment dispute with non-contracting states.   
The Rules nonetheless provide an important avenue through which investors 
can have their disputes with host states settled in the international arena, free 
from the challenges of having them adjudicated in the domestic legal system 
of the host state.201 
 
The existence of the Centre as a body specialised in administering and 
enabling the resolution of investment disputes in the international legal 
framework is vitally important for a number of reasons. Firstly, the resolution 
of disputes under the auspices of the Centre, allows for investors to take full 
advantage of the benefits of arbitration. In the context of investment disputes, 
time is often of the essence as in some cases investors are unable to proceed 
with their business undertakings as a result of an asset, which is central to 
their business operations, being expropriated. The fact that generally 
arbitrations proceed without undue delays and that tribunals render the 
decisions fairly quickly is of great importance to investors in this regard. 
 
Although arbitrations are as a general rule private proceedings, and the 
awards made thereunder, confidential and not available to the public, the 
Secretary General of the Centre is required to publish, with the consent of 
both disputing parties, reports of conciliation commissions or awards 
                                                            
200 L. Reed et al op cit 174  at 10. 
201 L. Reed et al op cit 174 at 55.  
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rendered by arbitral tribunals in ICSID proceedings.202 This ensures that other 
foreign investors are guided in the manner in which they may bring 
investment disputes in the international law framework or the remedies that 
may be available to them in the event of disputes arising.  
 
Investment arbitrations under the Centre however, still pose some challenges 
for investors. Firstly, and in direct contrast with the flexibility enjoyed by 
tribunals in making awards, is the fact that tribunals are not bound by the 
common law doctrine of stare decisis203. The lack of binding case law leads to 
lack of uniformity in the awards made by the tribunal over similar investor-
state disputes.204 It is argued that “although the ICSID has been widely accepted as 
an international body providing for international investment dispute arbitration, it 
has not yet attained the status of an overarching tribunal in international 
investments that is responsible for investor-state dispute resolution”.205 It is further 
submitted206 that in the context of investor state dispute resolutions 
conducted within the framework of the Centre, precedent should play a role 
because state measures affect not only investors, but other third parties for 
whom it is vital that precedent in respect of any decision made in a dispute 
between the investor (to whom it is connected) and the state, apply. This 
would be of significance in any related claim that such third party may bring 
against the state, to a tribunal constituted under the Centre. 
 
Perhaps the most notable impediment to the Centre’s ability to fully address 
the scepticism that may be had by foreign investors investing into developing 
economies, for reasons of unlawful expropriations of investment assets by 
host states207, is the fact that no provision is made for action to be taken 
against a party that defies an award of the tribunal. Although it is accepted 
that there are  inherent limitations that an arbitral tribunal has in relation to 
                                                            
202 In accordance with the ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation No.22 
203 M. Dimsey (2008) The Resolution of International Investment Disputes, 40. 
204 Ibid.  
205 Ibid. 
206 M Dimsey op cit 108 at 41. 
207 Particularly in politically and economically volatile states where such expropriations are more likely to occur. 
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ensuring the enforcement of an award by a state, it is submitted that the 
Convention could have well provided a mechanism whereby tribunals report 
to the Centre which in turn reports to the relevant organ of the World Bank, 
on the state’s conduct and depending on the extent of disregard of the award 
by the state, appropriate action could be taken against the state such as the 
imposition of [administrative] sanctions208 or expulsion from the Convention. 
 
The Centre, in setting out the consequences of non-compliance with orders of 
tribunals in this way, would serve as an effective deterrent to unlawful state 
conduct, and would further augment the serious and binding nature of 
investment arbitrations concluded under the Convention or the Rules.  
 
 
4.4 Possible proceedings that may be brought by LAP against the government 
of Zambia under the current international framework for investor-state 
dispute resolution 
4.4.1 Agreement-based arbitration 
It is probable209 that the main ‘sale’ agreement entered into between LAP and 
the Zambian government, namely the Share Sale and Purchase Agreement 
including other relevant transaction documents and agreements relating to 
the sale of the shares in Zamtel, contains an arbitration clause requiring the 
parties to refer any dispute that may arise between them to arbitration210. 
There is a possibility that the Zambian High Court may dismiss LAP’s 
applications that are before it, in light of any decision by LAP to commence 
arbitration proceedings parallel to the Zambian proceedings.211 Therefore, any 
                                                            
208 These could be to the effect that the recalcitrant state is not to benefit from the programmes or projects 
initiated by the World Bank Group. 
209 The SPA is not a publicly available document and thus an attempt at discussing its possible provisions is 
based on the assumption that it contains the usual clauses (such as arbitration) clauses found in sale agreements-
relating to large commercial transactions. 
210 The parties were further most likely to have referred their dispute to international institutional arbitration. 
211 It has been held by the High Court in the Supreme Court case of Development Bank of Zambia Limited and 
KPMG Peat Marwick vs. Sunvest Limited and Sun Pharmaceuticals Limited Judgment No. 3 of 1997 that the 
courts will generally dismiss an action before it if it determines that there is a “multiplicity of process” relating 
to the same matter as a result of a litigant commencing process before different for a. In that case, the court held 
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claims brought by LAP in arbitration proceedings must be couched in terms 
different to those in the domestic proceedings and to the extent possible, must 
be based on a distinct cause of action so as to prevent the dismissal of the 
proceedings by the domestic courts. There is further the possibility that the 
arbitration tribunal constituted to hear the dispute between LAP and the 
government may stay any proceedings212 pending the determination of the 
matter by the domestic courts.   
 
To the extent that LAP will be able to commence parallel proceedings against 
the government, this would be of significant advantage as LAP could then 
bring different claims that it may have against the government, separately 
before the two fora. An example relates to the declarations being sought by 
LAP in the constitutional petition before the domestic courts relating to inter 
alia, the return of the shares to LAP on the basis that the expropriation was 
illegal. An arbitral tribunal would not have the jurisdiction to make such a 
declaration and thus the parallel proceedings would allow LAP to seek such 
declarations before the domestic courts and the appropriate remedies from an 
arbitration tribunal. 
 
Further, in the event that there is no determination by the court of the amount 
of compensation that is payable to LAP or that the amount determined is 
ineffective, there is more likelihood that an arbitral tribunal would carry out a 
realistic and market-based calculation of the compensation payable by the 
government.   
 
The benefits of arbitration proceedings in general, as discussed in the 
previous chapter would be available to LAP if it decided to commence such 
proceedings. An important advantage of arbitration as it relates to the dispute 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
that there would be a multiplicity of process where: (a) the parties in two or more matters were the same; (b) the 
causes of actions in two or more matters were the same or similar (c) that two or more matters were arising from 
the same transaction of facts; and (d) the remedies or reliefs sought or likely to be granted in two or more 
matters were the same or similar. 
212 There could be determinations in the local courts that may act as issue estoppels binding on the arbitration 
tribunal and in such a case, a stay of the proceedings would be necessary. 
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between LAP and the government is the timeous determination of the dispute 
by the tribunal that is appointed by the parties. This would be particularly 
significant for LAP which may be anxious to have a clear position on its 
Zamtel shareholding as to enable make a determination on whether it may 
need to make another investment if its Zamtel shares will not be returned to 
it. However, the fact that in the context of the current dispute between LAP 
and Zamtel, the proceedings of a tribunal may have to be stayed as a result of 
the proceedings before the domestic courts, may to some extent, remove the 
advantage of the timeous determination of disputes, offered by arbitration. 
 
4.4.2 Regional based investor-state dispute resolution 
LAP would only be able to commence proceedings against the government 
under the auspices of the s SADC Tribunal in its un-repealed form, if the 
country in which it was incorporated, that is Libya, was like Zambia, also a 
member state of the SADC. LAP would however, still be able to commence 
proceedings before the Tribunal if locus standi of legal persons is interpreted 
(by the Tribunal itself) to extend to before the court does extend to legal 
persons who are nationals of non-member states but who are resident213 in 
member states.  
 
Therefore, there currently does not exist a means for the commencement of 
proceedings for unlawful expropriation by LAP the government under the 
current legal framework of the SADC discussed above and any attempts by 
LAP to follow this route in seeking to resolve its dispute with government 
would be an exercise in futility. 
 
4.4.3 International institution-based investor-state dispute resolution 
The primary international institution that is mandated to hear investment 
disputes is the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
                                                            




(ICSID), discussed above. As already pointed out214, the ICSID has jurisdiction 
to hear investment disputes between states and investors where either, the 
state is a contracting state of the ICSID Convention and the investor is a 
national of a contracting state of the Convention, or where only one of the 
parties is a contracting member thereof.215 
 
Although Libya is not a contracting state to the Convention, and LAP is 
therefore not a national of such contracting state, Zambia is a contracting state 
to the Convention216. As such LAP may commence proceedings against the 
government under the auspices of the ICSID as the latter would prima facie 
have jurisdiction to determine the matter. However, the fact that the ICSID 
would have jurisdiction to determine any investment dispute that would arise 
between the government and LAP would have to have been agreed between 
the parties in their relevant transaction documents prior to the dispute 
arising.217 If this was not agreed in the transaction documents by the parties, 
LAP and the government would have to both give their written consent 
(outside of the transaction documents), and in particular after the after the 
dispute has arisen, to have it determined by the ICSID.  
 
LAP may also be able to refer its dispute with the government to the ICSID if 
any investment treaty between its own government and the Zambian 
government provides for the referring of investment disputes to the ICSID, or 
where any Zambian investment laws218 confer such jurisdiction on the ICSID. 
In such a case, the ICSID would assume jurisdiction upon LAP commencing 
proceedings against the government. 
                                                            
214 See discussion on the ICSID Convention at 4.3.1. 
215 Article 25 (1) of the ICSID Convention. 
216 Zambia ratified the Convention on 17 June, 1970 and deposited its instruments of ratification on 17 July, 
1970, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&lang
uage=English, accessed on 19 January, 2014.  
217 As provided by Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention which requires written consent to have been given by 
the parties, of the ICSID’s jurisdiction over the dispute.  
218Under the auspices of the ZDA Act, section 17 (j) thereof makes provision for the government to enter into 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPA) with investors. IPPA’s primarily seek to guarantee 
investments made into Zambia. However, the particular IPPA that is negotiated with the government will 
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The resolution of investment disputes under the auspices of the ICSID is 
through arbitration and thus the advantages of arbitration as highlighted in 
the preceding sections would be available to LAP in the determination of the 
dispute. Further, the fact that the government would be unable to unilaterally 
withdraw219 from the proceedings once the ICSID assumes jurisdiction of the 
dispute would ensure that the former continues to participate in the 
proceedings until the final determination thereof. 
 
Finally, bringing the dispute before the ICSID would entail that any possible 
orders made against the government (which in the context of ordinary 
arbitration would usually be private), would be in the international public 
domain and this may serve to ensure compliance with the order by the 
government, for fear of international public reprisal for any failure to comply 
therewith.   
                                                            
219 Article 25 (1) provides that there may be no unilateral withdrawal from the proceedings where both parties 





5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
The right to expropriate property owned by citizens is the [necessary] right of 
every sovereign state. In some instances, the property in the hands of private 
citizens is required for a greater public purpose and it therefore becomes 
necessary for the state to take ownership of that property in order to utilise it 
for the benefit of the public, even if this is in conflict with the rights of 
property ownership of the affected citizen[s]. 
 
Expropriations must, however, only be undertaken by the state where there is 
a genuine and legitimate public interest or purpose sought to be protected or 
achieved by the expropriation and where the property owner who through no 
fault of his own, finds himself the unfortunate target of an expropriation, 
receives adequate compensation from the state, in a timeous and fair manner. 
 
Unfortunately, States have been known to abuse this sovereign right to 
expropriate property, doing so where there is no real or legitimate public 
purpose for the expropriation. In the context of commercial trade, there are 
numerous instances of unlawful or arbitrary expropriations of foreign 
investments by host states and in most instances, these expropriations have 
been motivated by the state’s own interest such as the need to ‘drive out’ 
those investors who do not serve its political interests  and not by any real 
public need. Further still, in some expropriations of foreign investments, 
states have failed or even refused to compensate the affected investors. 
 
The discussion in the preceding chapters has been an attempt at considering 
the various mechanisms through which a foreign investor may effectively 
commence proceedings against a host state where there is a clear case of an 
67 
 
unlawful expropriation220. This is in light of the unique nature of disputes 
between states and other private entities such as investors, with the result that 
the resolution of the dispute by the courts of the host state may prove 
ineffective for the investor, for a variety of reasons such as the perceived or 
actual partiality or lack of independence of the national courts in determining 
the dispute. The need therefore for impartial and independent international 
fora, in which investors may commence proceedings against states, cannot be 
overstated. 
 
The discussion of the various fora in which investors may commence 
proceedings against states for unlawful expropriations has also considered 
the possible orders that may be made against states, and whether such orders 
are effective for investors who allege illegality on the part of the state. 
Generally, and largely due to the sovereign nature of states, domestic, 
regional and international courts and tribunals are constrained in the orders221 
that they may make against states. In some instances, particularly in the case 
of domestic and regional courts, these constraints are not as a result of any 
particular limitation on their power but are rather borne out of political 
considerations and the unqualified respect for state sovereignty. 
 
Further, and connected to the above point, is that in order to be effective, 
orders that are handed down by regional and international courts or tribunals 
for unlawful expropriations, should serve as a deterrent to those and other 
states against carrying out unlawful or arbitrary expropriations of 
investments. The effective imposition of appropriate sanctions against states 
would serve as an effective deterrent and would do well to be expressly 
included as part of the orders that may be made against a state. 
                                                            
220 In the case of a lawful expropriation, it is assumed that an investor does not challenge the expropriation as 
being unlawful or arbitrary. There may be a dispute between the parties as to the amount of compensation 
payable but this does not equate to a challenge over the legality of the expropriation. The discussion in the paper 
therefore centred on the case of unlawful expropriations- where the expropriation does not meet the 
requirements of the host state or customary international law, including the refusal or non-payment of 
compensation by the state. 
221 For example an order that the expropriation by the host state is unlawful and that therefore, the expropriation 




The discussion of the current dispute between LAP Green Networks of Libya 
(LAP) and the Zambian government has made out an apparently clear case of 
at the very least an arbitrary, and possibly even an unlawful expropriation222 
of the former’s shares owned and held in Zamtel. The outcome of the [known] 
proceedings between LAP and the government will provide an important 
source of reference for foreign investors in Zambia, and in other developing 
nations who may be future subjects of unlawful expropriations, particularly 
where there has been a regime change.  
 
There will be important lessons to be learnt by foreign investors, from the case 
of LAP and the government. Perhaps the most important lesson will pertain 
to the need for ‘jurisdiction’ or dispute resolution clauses of investments 
agreements, to include the jurisdiction of effective regional or international 
courts or tribunals that have a specific mandate to settle investment disputes 
and which may therefore provide effective relief in the event of an unlawful 
expropriation of the investment assets being carried out by the state. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
In the current era of FDI, regional economic organisations223 should expressly 
include in the jurisdiction of their respective judicial organs, the 
determination of investment disputes between member states and foreign 
investors. Effective regional courts and tribunals will provide an independent 
platform for investors to commence proceedings against states outside 
domestic courts. This will serve to increase investor confidence and also allow 
for increased FDI, regionally. 
Further, the ability of investors to commence proceedings before regional 
tribunals will prove cost effective as in the absence of such tribunals, investors 
                                                            
222 This is to the extent that LAP succeeds in their contention that the government did not comply with the 
provisions of the Lands Acquisition Act in that no notice was given of the expropriation was required under the 
Act, that there was no public interest sought to be advanced by the government and that there has been no tender 
of compensation by the government. 
223 The reference to regional organisations is specifically a reference to African regional organisations. 
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will rely on having their disputes determined by international tribunals. The 
costs involved in instituting proceedings before international tribunals are 
often significantly higher than those instituted before regional tribunals. This 
further disadvantages investors who may have already suffered serious 
financial losses as a result of the expropriations of their property. 
 
However, regional courts and tribunals can only operate effectively if they 
acquire supra-national status. Regional organisations must therefore require 
member states to subordinate some measure of their domestic laws to those of 
the regional courts or tribunals.224 This will ensure that any orders given by 
regional courts are not overruled by domestic courts, therefore undermining 
the operation of the former. 
 
On the international platform, the ICSID provides the most effective 
mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes. However, it is 
recommended that in addition to the supervisory powers of the ICSID to 
ensure compliance (by states) with the orders of the tribunals constituted 
under its auspices, there should be a reporting mechanism to the World Bank 
(as the umbrella organisation to which ICSID belongs) by the former, through 
which it is recommended that appropriate action225 be taken against states 
that disregard compliance with orders of ICSID tribunals. This would be 
particularly relevant where the state involved is a beneficiary of World Bank 
funding in some form, or benefits from the activities thereof. 
 
Although the ICSID serves as the most important forum available 
internationally which is specifically mandated to hear investment disputes, it 
is submitted that there is need for an international investment court, created 
under the auspices of the United Nations (“UN”). Such a court would 
ordinarily have jurisdiction over member states of the UN which consent to 
                                                            
224 This should be done with respect to those matters or areas of law over which the regional court or tribunal 
has jurisdiction and which jurisdiction the member states have validly consented to. 
225 Appropriate action could relate to the imposition of administrative sanctions or even the refusal to provide 
funding to the state concerned. 
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its jurisdiction. The advantage of such a court is that it would be able to give 
orders against states that an arbitration tribunal may be limited in its powers 
to give, such as declaratory orders or nullification of illegal state actions. In 
the context of unlawful expropriations, such a court may direct that the state 
reverse the expropriation. Further still, the court may recommend to the 
relevant organ of the UN 226  that relevant sanctions be imposed against a 
state which fails to comply with an order thereof.  
 
For investors, the need for clauses in investment agreements, prohibiting 
unlawful expropriations must become more comprehensive. In this regard, it 
would be worthwhile to include the standards of international customary law 
as to when an expropriation will be deemed lawful. Further, such clauses 
should (with reference to the relevant legislation), point out the relevant 
procedure to be followed in the case of a dispute arising regarding an 
expropriation, including the procedure for the payment of compensation or 
any damages to the investor. 
 
Further, it is recommended that investors insist on the conclusion of BITs or 
other forms of investment protection agreements with states, containing 
international law standards of protection for the investor, before concluding 
the relevant investment agreements. These BITs should further contemplate 
the jurisdiction of investment dispute-specific tribunals such as the ICSID, 
ensuring that any consent that may be required before such tribunals may 
assume jurisdiction, is ‘perfected’ prior to the dispute arising.  
                                                            
226This could be the General Assembly (GA) which is the main deliberative assembly and in which all member 
states have equal representation. The GA would be appropriate because any decision to impose sanctions would 
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